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ABSTRACT

PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE
OF TUBERCULOSIS
TO HEALTH CARE WORKERS

by
Thomas C. Carle

The resurgence of tuberculosis in the United States within the past decade
has prompted the health care community to develop tuberculosis elimination
policies. However, recent outbreaks of tuberculosis have proved to be resistant
to multiple antibiotics. Tuberculosis infections among health care workers is
also rising. This increase in occupational exposures has prompted the
examination of current exposure control measures.
The occupational exposure to tuberculosis is prevented by the use of
administrative policies, engineering controls and personal protective equipment.
Each control measure has inherent strengths and weaknesses and when
implemented through an exposure control plan the risk of occupational exposure
can be reduced. Control techniques currently utilized may benefit from
additional research and development. The research will not be squandered if
tuberculosis is ultimately eliminated, as the knowledge gained may prove
beneficial for exposure protection from future bio-hazardous aerosols.
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CHAPTER 1

THE TUBERCULOSIS BACILLI

1.1 Introduction
Tuberculosis has been acknowledged as a major health threat throughout the
history of mankind. Despite the decline of new cases experienced during the
middle of this century, it has again become a serious threat in the United States.
Once again research and technology have been applied towards the prevention
and cure of tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is caused by a bacteria called the
Mycobacterium tuberculosis also known as tubercle bacillus (TB) which is
coined from the Latin word tubercle, meaning small lump or nodule. The lungs
are the predominate site of the infection; however, any body tissue is
susceptible. When a significant infection develops in the lung, necrosis may
occur, often the size of a nut or small egg, that heals either by fibrosis,
encapsulation, calcification or scar formation. When these lesions soften and
break down through liquidfication, the characteristic cavity within the lung
associated with TB remains. Despite the constant decline of new cases since
1953, TB has realized a resurgence in the U.S. beginning in 1985. To discuss
the implications and the contributing factors of this increase and its impact on
the health care community, it is necessary to first understand the history,
etiology, epidemiology and pathogenesis of TB.
1
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1.2 History
TB ravaged skeletons from pre-historic times have been discovered and prebiblical references made of a human illness similar to TB in the pre-2000 BC
Code of Hummurabi, demonstrating that TB has had a long history with
mankind. This scourge was known as "phthisis" by the Greeks, "consumption"
in the Bible, the "great white plague" in the Victorian era, and finally, as
"tuberculosis" beginning with the age of modern medicine. Hippocrates (460-377
BC) considered TB to be the gravest of all the diseases at that time, the most
difficult to cure and the most fatal (1). That sentiment followed for hundreds
of years as physicians were discouraged from treating advanced cases of TB
since the patient would surely die and damage their reputation, that is until the
age of modern medicine.
The modern discoveries initiated by Rene Théophile Laënnec who invented
the stethoscope in 1816 and L. Auenbrugger who re-developed chest percussion
from the ancient Greek technique in the late 1700's, allowed clinical diagnosis
and the physical signs and morbid anatomy of TB to be defined. Also proposed
was evidence that this single disease which originated in the lung could have a
systemic effect on other body tissues. Laënnec never believed that TB was
contagious or transmissible. However, he ironically infected himself when sawing
a cadaver skeleton during an autopsy in what was described as one of the first
documented accounts of transference of TB (2). In 1868, Jean-Antoine Villemin
proposed that TB was an inoculable agent or germ and was transferable from
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man or cow and that TB never originates spontaneously and is perpetuated only
by transmission through society (3). In 1882, Robert Koch isolated the tubercle
bacillus by use of a staining process. Koch's discovery finally ended the
assumptions made for thousands of years that the disease was hereditary and
attributed to "bad blood" or "bad hereditary" (4). The invention of the
microscope, allowed a detailed examination of sputum cultures with staining
techniques. The discovery of X-rays in 1885 by Roentgen revealed the presence
of cavity formations in the lung enabling an accurate diagnosis to be made.
Typically, those who were identified as being infected with TB often convalesced
at sanatoria where bed rest, good food and moderate exercise along with surgery
in the more severe cases served as the only relief of the disease's symptoms.
Surgical techniques relieved suffering and put diseased portions of the lung at
rest and collapsing the lung by artificial pneumothorax or removal of portions
of the lung resection or lobectomy. Finally, with the development of
streptomycin by Selman A. Waksman, the first chemotherapy was made
available for the treatment of TB.
In 1945, the first attempts at chemotherapy with Waksman's streptomycin
were made. Streptomycin is an antibacterial antibiotic which was combined later
with another antibiotic called para-aminosalicylic acid (PAS). This combination
of drugs delayed the emergence of streptomycin resistant strains of TB. With
the introduction of isoniazid (INH), another antibiotic in 1952, three drugs were
now available for the treatment of TB. PAS and INH were given orally,
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typically for a course of 18 to 24 months. In 1962, PAS was replaced by
Ethambutol which had fewer adverse side effects. Chemotherapy was extremely
effective and had practically forced the closing of the sanitoriums in the US by
1960. In 1966, rifampin (RIF) was added to the chemotherapy regimen which
allowed the treatment period to be nearly cut in half.

1.3 Etiology
The ground work for the modern etiology of TB was proposed by Robert Koch
in his paper The Etiology of Tuberculosis (5) that was presented before the
Physiological Society of Berlin on March 24, 1881 leaving the audience in utter
silence as he struck down the beliefs of many of his opponents in attendance.
Koch understood from Villemin's and the research of others that TB was
transmissible and that some nature of a parasite or bacteria was responsible for
its transmission.

Koch systematically analyzed suspected tuberculosis

microorganisms and, through the development of a specific staining process, was
able to isolate the Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Koch was able to subsequently
grow the bacteria in an artificial medium and inoculate laboratory animals which
resulted in TB infections. There was nothing extraordinary with regards to his
methodology; however, he received much world acclaim for being the first to
isolate the previously unseen "greatest killer of mankind".
Mycobacterium tuberculosis is an obligate intracellular parasite or nonmotile
rod as shown in Figure 1. TB shares a particular staining quality with other acid
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fast aerobic bacilli (AFB). After staining with a carbol-fuchsin compound and
then washing with nitric acid, the cell walls that contain lipids absorb the stains
and form a stable complex with the cells allowing the identification of the
organism by turning the AFB red and all other tissue blue.

Figure 1 The Mycobacterium tuberculosis (X 90,000 by electron microscope)
Various strains of TB have occurred and taxonomists disagree as to whether
to divide the genus Mycobacterium tuberculosis into three complexes: M.
tuberculosis, M. bovis and M. africanum where others would consider M.
tuberculosis to be the only complex with subclassifications for the M. bovine or
M. african type.

1.4 Epidemiology
As indicated in his 1865 paper, On the Cause and Nature of Tuberculosis and Its
Inoculation From Man to Rabbit, (6) Villemin demonstrated that TB could be
transferred among animals with the injection of sputum or blood from
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infections, utilizing control experiments. He further concluded that TB was a
specific virus (although TB is actually a bacterium) which did not occur
spontaneously and was not the product of emaciation, misery, atmospheric
disturbances, heredity, occupations nor progressive maladies (6). Three years
later in his book Etudes sur la Tuberculosis, (3) Villemin further proposed that
TB was more prevalent among medical personnel, soldiers stationed in barracks
than among troops in the field, prisoners, industrial workers and members of
cloistered religious orders. Villemin found that TB was less prevalent at higher
altitudes and among those groups that live in the open air in a nomadic state,
and more prevalent in cities and among groups that are confined indoors (3).
His recommendations for combating TB included the improvement of working
conditions, ventilation and the disinfection of things and places occupied by
consumptive patients.
Today, it's understood that TB is transmitted via airborne aerosols 1-5
microns in diameter which are generated by persons infected with pulmonary or
laryngeal TB where active bacteria are expelled when they cough, sneeze, speak
or sing (8). The aerosolized particles may be suspended in air or travel on
ambient air currents for long periods. Those infected in extrapulmonary sites are
not contagious via the airborne route, however, care must be utilized when
handling infected human tissue. TB thrives in dark, moist places and dies on
exposure to sunlight and drying (9). Linens, eating utensils and bed clothes are
not considered viable routes of infection. Other less frequent routes of exposure
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include injection through the skin by laboratory workers who may be cut by glass
containing actively growing TB cultures, surgeons and nurses in operating
theaters who aerolize TB infected tissue during surgery and pathologists
conducting postmortems on TB infected corpses. In the days of unpasteurized
milk M. bovis was transmitted causing TB of the tonsils and submandibular
lymph nodes of humans.
Other contributing factors in susceptibility to TB include concentration of
aerosol droplet nuclei in the air and length of exposure. Once infected, only 5%
to 10% of persons not HIV+ will show clinical signs of the disease in their
lifetime (10). Pulmonary sites account for 85% of cases of TB while
extrapulmonary sites such as blood, central nervous system, pleura, pericardium,
genitourinary, gastrointestinal tract, adrenal, liver, mouth, middle ear, larynx,
bronchial tree, lymph, bones and joints represent the remaining 15%.
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has recently classified the following
groups as high risk for developing TB. This group includes persons who are
HIV+ or who are suspected of being HIV+; those in close contact with newly
diagnosed infectious TB patients; recent converters of TB skin tests; persons
with chest X-rays indicative of old healed TB; intravenous drug users or persons
with other medical conditions known to be susceptible to TB. Other risk factors
identified include foreign-born persons from high prevalence countries,
medically underserved low-income populations and residents of long term care
facilities (11).

Other investigators believe that health care workers also

facing 8

Table 1 Reported Cases and Rates of Tuberculosis in the United States
CASES
1985 1990
Totals
Sex
males
female
unknown
Age
0-4
5-14
15-24
25-44
45-64
>64
unknown
Race/Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific
Islander
Native Alaskan/
American
Other
Country of Origin
Foreign
US-born
Unknown

%

RATE per 100,000 persons
%
1985 1990

22,201 25,701 +15.8

9.3

10.3

+10.8

14,496 16,966 +17.0
7,704
8,729 +13.3
1
6

12.5
6.3
-

14.0
6.8
-

+12.0
+7.9

789
472
1,672
6,758
6,138
6,356
16

936
660
1,867
9,730
6,365
6,115
28

+18.6
+39.8
+11.7
+44.0
+3.7
-3.8
-

4.4
1.4
4.2
9.2
13.7
22.3
NA

5.1
1.9
5.1
12.0
13.7
19.6
NA

+15.9
+35.7
+21.4
+30.4
0.0
-12.1
-

8,453
7,592
3,092

7,836
-7.3
9,634 +26.9
4,782 +54.7

4.5
27.1
17.3

4.2
33.0
21.4

-6.7
+21.8
+23.7

2,530

3,027

+19.6

46.0

41.6

397
137

371
51

-6.5
-

24.9
NA

18.9
NA

-24.1
-

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

-

4,925 6,626 +27.1
17,712 18,997 +7.3
131
442
-

-9.6

Source: Center for Disease Control. 1990. "Tuberculosis Morbidity in the United
States Final Data,1990" Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 40 SS-3.
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represent a high risk group. The CDC recognizes the potential for the spread
of TB among health care workers and patients alike within health care facilities
and has prepared recommendations outlining a set of guidelines for the
prevention of contamination.
The latest published data by the CDC from 1990, shown in Table 1,
indicates the greatest rise in new cases of TB to be among the age group
between 25 to 44 with a 44% increase over the 1985 data. The rise in new cases
of 39.8% among the 5 to 1.4 year old's is attributed to the fact that most often,
an older family member in the 25 to 44 age group has contracted the illness and
transfers the TB bacteria by virtue of living in the same household (12). The
only declines among new cases were found in members of the groups belonging
to the white non-hispanic and Native American or Alaskan groups. Increases
in new TB cases also have been shown to parallel those of new cases within the
HIV epidemic mainly occurring in males within the 25 to 44 year old age group.

1.5 Pathology
In the primary phase of TB, assuming the bacteria are airborne and able to pass
through the upper airways defenses of the mucosal membranes or cilia, the 1-2
micron diameter organisms will lodge in the alveoli of the lungs, usually in the
lower or mid lung fields, while those larger than 3-5 microns in size deposit
higher in the respiratory tract. Once trapped, the bacteria multiply and spread
through the lymph system and blood stream, quickly infecting other organs,
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typically those high in oxygen concentration. Inflammation occurs at the site of
initial deposition in the lung forming granulomas consisting of epithelioid cells,
macrophages and giant cells. As the infected person's immune system becomes
sensitized and recognizes the bacteria, macrophages attack, not destroying, but
engulfing and surrounding the TB organism and walling them off in tiny hard
capsules called tubercles throughout the body (13). Depending on the
concentration, virulence of the bacteria and effectiveness of the immune system,
these granulomas in the lung (if they are large enough) may cause a form of
necrosis called caseation, which has the consistency of soft cheese (14). The
caseaum softens and liquifies when attacked by the toxin emitting cytotoxic
lymphocyte macrophage of the immune system. A cavity will form in the lung
when this liquid material and lung tissue is expelled. In less serious infections,
the initial site may heal completely without any cavitation. The secondary stage
consists of the healing process of the primary infection which includes the
formation of cavities and scar tissue in the lung.
During the third stage, the bacilli remain encapsulated by the macrophage.
They may remain encapsulated for the lifetime of the patient, and may never
cause a reactivation of the disease. However, should the immune system
become depressed and the macrophages weaken, a fourth stage will occur when
the bacteria reactivate and multiply. This process occurs in a relatively small
population of normally healthy persons not infected with an immunosuppressant
illness like HIV. This multiplication often will occur in the lung usually at the
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apex, or at other extrapulmonary sites. A fifth stage occurs if a previously
infected person becomes again infected with a variant bacilli of drug sensitivity
different from that of the primary infection.

1.6 Signs and Symptoms
The early medical community unknowingly often placed TB within a general
class of illness with similar characteristics. The early Greeks utilized the word
phthisis meaning "wasting of the body" to describe the fluid losses of the body
from diarrhea in the latter stages of the illness, and from drenching sweats (4).
Later, consumption was used to describe the burning up or wasting of the body.
Finally, tuberculosis was used to describe the illness from the Latin word
tuberculum, meaning lump.
One of the earliest and most encompassing descriptions of the disease was
by the early Roman physician Caelius Aurelianus who stated:
The symptoms of the disease are as follows: there is a latent fever,
which generally begins toward the end of the day and is relieved by
the coming of the new day; this is accompanied by much coughing at
the beginning and end of the night, with discharge of sanious sputa...
The voice is either hoarse or high pitched, breathing difficult, cheeks
flushed, and the rest of the body ashen colored. The eyes have a
worn appearance, and the patient is emaciated, a fact more obvious
from the appearance of the naked body. In some cases there is a
hissing sound or wheezing in the chest; and, as the disease spreads,
there is sweating in the upper parts down to the end of the chest.(15)
Pulmonary tuberculosis, as previously indicated, is asymptomatic at first.
The initial signs of fever, weakness and weight loss are very subtle and often
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unnoticed. Signs become more apparent once the lesion in the lung is visible
on X-ray. A cough occurs as secretions are drained from necrotic lung tissue
into the bronchi. The cough is more productive usually in the morning from the
accumulation of secretions overnight while sleeping. The expectorate or sputum
produced from the cough is green and purulent and is minimal at first,
increasing as cavitation occurs. As cavitation ends and the illness enters a more
chronic stage, the expectorant becomes yellowish. Hemoptysis, or the coughing
of blood, may occur as cavitation erodes an arterial wall, or inflammation of the
endobronchial tree develops. Bleeding may range from slight streaking in the
sputum to massive bleeding, but is rarely fatal. Chest wall pain may occur as
the pleural lining of the lung may become inflamed by effusion of fluids.
Dyspnea, or shortness of breath, may occur from spontaneous pneumothorax or
pleural effusion (16).

1.7 Diagnosis
The tuberculin skin test is useful in determining if a patient is infected, however,
a negative test should not exclude a diagnosis of TB (16). Several tests have
been developed, all of which utilize a purified protein derivative (PPD) antigen
which is introduced to challenge the immune system. The most effective
method is an intradermal injection called Mantoux's Test. Other methods
include a scratch method called Pirquet's Test or a multipuncture tine test.
Typically five tuberculin units (TU) are administered, however, one TU may be
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utilized for young children. A positive test results in a palpable induration or
upwelling of the injection site over 10mm in 48 hours.
As the skin test is not a definitive indicator if a patient is infected, the
importance of taking a careful history and conducting a through physical
examination by the physician cannot be mitigated. When suspicion of TB exists,
the patient should be asked if contact has been made with known TB infected
patients or members of high risk groups. Chest X-rays may be useful for
showing cavitation; however, this may not always be diagnosed by the radiologist
who may interpret the finding as another malady. Bacterial examination of
sputum samples which test positive for staining AFB also will prove effective;
however, other AFB's besides TB cannot be ruled out by this method.
Definitive diagnosis can only be made with the cultural identification of the
sputum samples. This process currently takes three to six weeks and entails the
growing of the bacteria in a culture medium. One advantage to this technique
is the capability of determining the varying degree of resistance to antibiotics
utilized in combating TB should a new drug resistant strain be present.

1.8 Summary
Modern medicine prevailed during the middle of this century in the war against
TB. Thousands of lives were saved as the result of the development of
antibiotics. The advent of multidrug resistant TB strains has made the potential
for cure more difficult. This has increased the importance of understanding the
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pathology, epidemiology and etiology of TB in order to prevent its unnecessary
transmission through society. The public health service must disseminate their
knowledge to make the general public, and health care workers in particular,
aware of the need for concern.

CHAPTER 2

THE NEED FOR CONCERN

2.1 Introduction
Once known to be the leading cause of death among young adults during the
industrial revolution in both Europe and the United States, and once commonly
called the "great white plague", the tuberculosis bacilli is again showing a
resurgence in new cases in the US. These outbreaks have prompted the Public
Health Service's, Advisory Committee for Elimination of Tuberculosis (ACET)
to propose as a goal the elimination of TB in the US by year 2010. The
diseases resurgence has been attributed to several factors: the increase in
multidrug-resistant strains of TB, susceptibility of patients infected with HIV to
TB, immigration of infected persons into the US, and the weakening of the
healthcare infrastructure. Ironically, the health care system which is charged
with the task of caring for the sick, may unknowingly bring patient's with active
TB together with those with depressed immunosystems, such as, HIV. This new
resurgence has made it essential for the health care community to examine its
existing infrastructure to insure that additional exposures do not occur among
health care workers and patients alike. A discussion of each causative factor
and its implication related to the recent increase in outbreak of tuberculosis
follows in this chapter.
14
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2.2 Resurgence of Tuberculosis in the United States
On the world wide level, particularly in third world countries, TB has continued
at epidemic levels for decades despite the development of antibiotics. The
World Health Organization estimates that 8 million new cases and 3 million
deaths occur annually (17). Fortunately, these massive epidemic levels have not
reached the US, but a resurgence nevertheless is occurring here. The total
number of TB cases began declining in the US following the clinical
introduction of streptomycin in 1947. As shown in Table 2, the death rate also
decreased significantly with the introduction of antibiotics.

Table 2 Tuberculosis Morbidity an Mortality in the United States

YEAR
1930
1947
1950
1953
1959

NEW CASES
124,940
134,946
121,742
106,925

TB DEATHS
88,010
48,064
33,959
19,393
11,429

DEATH RATE
per 100,000
71.0
33.0
22.0
12.0
6.5

Source: Selman A. Waksman The Conquest of Tuberculosis. Berkeley and Los
Angeles: The University of California Press 1964, 23.

The CDC began collecting TB data nation wide in a standardized

manner in 1953. The data indicated that from 1953 and until 1985, the rate of
new cases has declined steadily by 5% to 6% each year. However, from the
period between 1985 to 1991 an 18% increase in new cases was reported. This
represents 39,000 additional cases beyond those normally expected (10). Figure
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Table 3 HIV Mortality Data for 1990
1990 CASES
Totals
Sex
males
female
Age
0-4
5-12
13-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
>60
Race/Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific
Islander
Native Alaskan/
American

43352
38094
5258
626
162
170
8334
19728
10023
3020
1289
22326
13211.
7353
271
79

Source:Center for Disease Control. 1992. "Update, Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome United States 1991 " Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report.
41: No 26.
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2 shows the graph of the increase over the projected decline.

Figure 2 Graph of Expected Cases of TB vs Actual Cases
Source: Snider, Dixie E. and Dooley, Samuel W. 1993. Nosocomial Tuberculosis
in the AIDS Era With a Emphasis on Multidrug Resistant Disease."
Heart and Lung. 22:366.
With the recent upward trend in new cases, the CDC realized that the war
against TB was not over. Greater emphasis was now placed on the
identification of the predisposing factors leading to this increase.

2.2.1 The HIV Epidemic
The increase in new TB infections correlated with those population groups
which experienced increases in HIV. The socio-economic, age and geographic
location factors of those groups which have the greatest growth of TB are
similar to those with HIV. Table 3 shows the latest data concerning the growth
of HIV.
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A comparison of Tables 1 and 3, confirms the parallel increasing growth of
TB and HIV within the same groupings. The male sex and the middle age
groupings show the greatest number of new cases in both TB and HIV infection
in the United States. As TB is a disease which becomes reactivated when the
natural immunosuppressant system weakens, these correlations between HIV &
TB are to be expected.
One study conducted by the CDC in 1990 and 1991 examined multidrug
resistant TB outbreaks in six hospitals. Of a total of 200 patients, most had
HIV or AIDS and showed the clinical signs of active TB varying from two weeks
to several months. The mortality was 72% to 89%, death usually resulted in
four to 16 weeks following diagnosis of TB (10).
The CDC recognized the immunological association between HIV and TB
and added TB to its list of AIDS indicator diseases in December 1992. With
this addition, TB joined 24 other diseases found to be prevalent in AIDS cases.
This correlation will further enhance collaboration between TB and HIV/AIDS
programs and allow preventative therapy to be provided to HIV contact
individuals who test TB positive (18).

2.2.2 Multidrug Resistant Tuberculosis
A study conducted in New York City in 1991 indicated that 33% of TB cases
were resistant to at least one antibiotic and 19% were resistant to both isoniazid
and rifampin (19). One strain was found to be resistant to seven drugs (10). Of

18
the total cases in 1991, multidrug resistant TB (MRTB) accounted for 6.9% of
cases, a increase from 3% for the period between 1982 and 1986 (19). This
significant increase of a bacterial mutated strain during such a short time frame
has the public health community concerned.
MRTB is a result of a spontaneous genetic mutation. The cause of resistant
strains is most often the result of the non-compliance with patient's medications,
which allows the mutated strains to multiply while antibiotics, which may still be
effective, are not taken. The drug resistant property is unknown at the start of
a treatment regiment and can only be determined following an in-vitro culture
examination which may take several weeks. A study of the infection rates of
MRTB vs TB found the rates to be approximately the same (19). The CDC has
recommended an initial treatment course of four different antibiotics to combat
the current strains of TB.
The impact of these MRTB strains upon the resurgence of TB in general is
two-fold. First, the MRTB's are more difficult to cure as multiple drug
regimens are required, and close supervision is needed to assure that the patient
consumes all required medications so as not to permit the evolution of another
drug resistant strain. Second, the economic impact associated with the
administration of these drug programs deprive other areas of funds which may
be utilized in education and/or prevention. The impact of MRTB will be
discussed in a future chapter.
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2.2.3 Foreign Born Persons Entering the United States
The Advisory Committee for the Elimination of Tuberculosis has recognized the
impact of foreign born individuals entering the US who have TB or who come
from countries which have a high prevalence of TB. This development has
prompted the CDC to issue a set of recommendations in December 1990. In
1989, the CDC projected that the TB incidence rate for the overall US
population was 9.5 persons per 100,000 and the incidence rate among foreign
born persons entering the US to be 124 persons per 100,000. Most of these
individuals immigrated from one of six countries: Mexico, Philippines, Vietnam,
South Korea, Haiti or China. Data available on illegal aliens is not available;
however, it is estimated that a high prevalence also exists within that population
group since they often stem from the lower socioeconomic groups of their home
countries which also tend to have a higher prevalence of TB similar to those in
the US.
Currently, a physical examination conducted by physicians appointed by the
local consulate is required for those who wish to immigrate permanently to the
United States. The examination includes the taking of a medical history, a chest
X-ray for those 15 years of age or older (or a TB skin test for those younger
than 15 if the adolescent's family member has active TB or if the child is ill).
If the immigrant is determined to have TB, the physician may classify the
patient either as Class A or Class B depending upon the disease's
communicability. Class B, "Tuberculosis, not considered active" is given if the
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comparison of a old chest X-ray from at least three months ago shows no
changes or, Class A, "Tuberculosis active, non-communicable for travel
purposes" for those individuals who do not have a previous X-ray and who test
negative for AFB in two consecutive sputum smears. Class B individuals may
receive their visas, but Class A must receive a waiver from the local consulate
to enter the US. Both classes must follow up with visits to the local public
health boards if permitted to travel to the US. The philosophy of the current
procedure is to exclude those who are actively contagious and begin treatment
until a time when they are no longer communicable, and to help manage the
illness once they arrive in the US. The CDC has identified several areas of the
present policy which are problematic.
Various problems cited include several aspects of the procedure. The
misdiagnosis of the condition as a result of incorrect interpretation of the chest
X-ray, clerical errors, fraud by the applicant in providing "doctored" or
purchased normal X-rays, or failure to produce sputum samples when requested.
The physical exam is valid for one year, which would tend to exclude identifying
those individuals who may have contracted TB some time after their physical
exam. The failure of immigrants to report for follow up exams with domestic
health departments upon arrival in the US has been identified to be as large as
one third for both Class A or Class B infected individuals. When follow-up was
made in the US, it was found the classification between A's and B's was often
in error, possibly as a result of crude techniques utilized overseas. Those
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treated in their home countries may have developed multi-drug resistant TB as
a result of inadequate treatment because of the limited resources available. Only
immigrants who desire permanent residence are required to submit to a physical.
This step excludes most students or those with temporary visas. Cases were
found where some immigrants entered the US on a temporary basis specifically
for TB treatment. This further taxes the health care system. Finally, the
problems associated with increasing numbers of illegal aliens and the language
barriers which exist between the health officials further hamper the proper
management of the illness in the US. For these reasons, the CDC has proposed
a number of modifications to the current system.
In order to mitigate many of the problems described above, various
recommendations were made. The CDC still recommends that chest X-rays and
skin testing should still be required for immigrants; and those who test positive
should all be considered Class A, thus eliminating the Class B diagnosis
overseas. This allows public health authorities in the US to further classify the
illness and recommend appropriate treatment. For those individuals who have
positive AFB sputum smears, treatment should begin overseas until negative
smears are obtained in two consecutive days, and only then should a waiver be
granted to travel. Advanced arrangements with a local health department or
private physician in the US who will agree to treat the illness or make the
required follow-up examination will be required for those entering on waivers.
Quarantine officers at ports of entry will continue to notify local public health
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departments of the arrival of such immigrants and to anticipate a follow-up
within ten days with the prearranged health care provider. Private physicians
treating patients must notify the local health department within 30 days if the
immigrant has not reported for evaluation. Those who refuse treatment should
be quarantined as provided by law. Finally, a quality assurance program should
be established and overseas physicians conducting screening exams for local
consulates given a standard written procedure for the exam. Corrective action
against the physician could be taken if these procedures are not followed.
Refugees who seek political asylum in the US share many of the same
infection problems as those who immigrate via regular channels. For refugees
entering the United States from high prevalence countries in Southeast Asia, all
ages must also undergo a TB skin test in addition to chest radiographs. They
too must receive preventive TB therapy if their skin test is positive. All refugees
from these areas must also follow up with local health departments upon arrival
in the US. Refugees from other countries will follow the same procedures as
other immigrants, but they must still follow up with local health departments
even if X-ray abnormalities are not uncovered.
In both scenarios the local health departments play a key role in controlling
both the immigrant and refugee populations residing in the US. These
departments have been charged with the task of screening, prevention and
treatment of many of these immigrants. Needless to say, the economic
resources required to fulfill these requirements are substantial. With three
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quarters of foreign born arrivals settling in New York, New Jersey, California,
Florida, Texas and Illinois, these regions are especially hard hit. In order for
the ACET to realize their proposal to eliminate TB in the US by 2010, the
entire health care infrastructure must be examined.

2.2.4 Health Care Infrastructure
The health care infrastructure encompasses a broad spectrum which includes the
facilities and personnel of hospitals, clinics, private offices, dental offices,
emergency medical services, the public health service, administrative policies,
governmental legislation, private accreditation and even the training and
education provided to employee and patient alike. As with any chain, it is only
as strong as its weakest link. One of the weaker links within the system appears
to be the inability to diagnose active TB early. Late detection enables the illness
to be needlessly transmitted to other persons including family members,
hospitalized patients or health care workers.
The data suggest that the highest populations of new cases of TB have
occurred within those socio-economic groups which belong to the lower classes
and who live in urban areas where the local hospital emergency department
(ED) serves as the primary care facility. Most of these facilities are over taxed
caring for the normal emergency case load. The early symptoms of TB are very
subtle and even when noticed, may be confused with many other maladies. In
a busy ED, the likelihood of a misdiagnosis is multiplied causing other patients
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and health care workers to be exposed to a communicable aerosol. Recent
attempts to prevent such over-crowding of ED's in urban areas include the
establishment of satellite clinics where a continuity of care may be provided. In
these settings preventative medicine may also be applied, and a more rapid
diagnosis of TB established with routine testing. Once identified, those
diagnosed with TB may be referred to special clinics for those diagnosed with
HIV or TB. These facilities assure that the most current and continuous level
of care may be provided for such patients.

CHAPTER 3

TREATMENT OF TUBERCULOSIS

3.1 Historical View and Early Treatments
The Romans believed climate influenced the prognosis of phthisis and the cure
was to be found only in a warm thy climate. Hence those afflicted that have
financial means would travel to Egypt or Sicily. Long sea voyages and the warm
ocean air inhaled by the patients was thought to be a cure. The Greeks believed
that nutrition and fluid intake played a key role in the cure of phthisis. Galen,
early in the first century indicated that consumptive patients should occupy a
cool, well ventilated underground room (4). Many believed that sunshine was
the surest cure and recommended habitation in sunny southern climates. This
theory was later justified by scientific evidence as Koch demonstrated that the
Mycobacteria tuberculosis in culture form was shown to die when exposed to
sunlight. Diet and absolute bed rest was stressed by others, contrary to those
who believed the consumptive patient should exercise regularly.
Obscure cures utilized prior to the age of modern medicine included the
drinking of woman's, goat's, cow's or ass' milk. The remedies of an early
Roman naturalist named Pliny, suggested the intake of a wolfs liver boiled in
wine, inhaling smoke of burning cowdung through a reed, the drinking of
elephant's blood mixed with the milk of a woman or ass or the eating of mice
25
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boiled in salt and oil (2). Cold bathing and "breathing into a hole fresh cut into
the earth" was recommended by John Wesley in the eighteenth century.
Primitive attempts at early chemotherapy included treating patients with salt
compounds of iron, sodium chloride, chlorine gas, digitalis, creosote, iodine and
preparations of gold and silver. All of these compounds proved ineffective
against curing TB and in many cases, actually caused complications (4).
In retrospect the most effective of these early treatments proved to be
convalescence in better climates, good nutrition and the advocacy of proper rest
augmented with slight exercise. These methods were combined leading to the
eventual development of the sanatoria, after the Latin word sanare meaning to
cure or heal.

3.2 The Sanatorium
In the early 1800's a young botanical student named Hermann Brehmann
suffered from TB and was told by his doctor to convalesce in a better climate.
Brehmann left Germany for the Himalaya Mountains where he conducted
botanical research. He ultimately recovered and returned to Germany to study
medicine. He presented his findings regarding TB to the medical community
in 1854 in his thesis entitled Tuberculosis is Curable (5) and settled in
Görbersdorf. There he built a house in the middle of a pine forest where he
treated TB patients with nourishment and life in the open air. Although
sanitoria were establish prior to Görbersdorf, the techniques Brehmann utilized
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met with success and became the model for sanitoria for many years. The
typical treatment utilized was to first rest the patient until the fever subsided.
Once the fever broke, exercise was introduced, gradually at first, and then
increased to a level allowing for completion of a day's normal activities.
Edward Trudeau MD, said to be the American pioneer of TB, was one of
the first to successfully develop a sanatorium philosophy domestically. Trudeau,
who himself was infected with TB, was not satisfied with his grave prognosis and
set out to find a successful treatment. He left for the Adirondack Mountains
near Saranac Lake, New York where he could rest and "lead a open-air life in
the great forest, alone with nature". In 1885, he established the Adirondack
Cottage Sanatorium and committed himself to the study of TB. The sanatoria
and specialized hospitals spread quickly across the US in the late nineteenth
century. One of the first specialized hospitals established in the United States
was the Chestnut Hill Hospital in Philadelphia in 1886. Specialized wards
previously had been established at Bellevue Hospital and City Hospital in New
York City.
The period of the sanitorium lasted for many decades. The quality of life
for many improved because of the rest and fresh air provided at the sanitorium.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the sanitorium system, was the
consolidation of resources and sharing of knowledge towards the research and
care for those inflicted with TB. The establishment of professional societies like
the National Tuberculosis Association and the sponsoring of International
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Conferences enhanced cooperation among the medical community. Work
stemming from these organizations aided in public health campaigns, early
detection through the use of X-rays, and public education.
With the advent of chemotherapy, the need for long convalescence at
sanitoria or specialized hospitals ended. Initial therapy would now be started at
general hospitals followed by care given at home. Where once long waiting lists
existed at the turn of the century, beds were now vacant at TB sanitoria. By
1960, most of these facilities were closed or converted into old age convalescent
centers.

3.3 Early Surgery
Surgical methods introduced at the sanatorium included the artificial
pneumothorax, thoracoplasty, lobectomy or pneumonectomy. These techniques
were performed for more difficult cases where rest and fresh air did not relieve
the symptoms. Surgeons typically developed new techniques in the military and
passed this knowledge on when returning to private practice.
The artificial pneumothorax developed by Carlo Forlanini in 1888
introduced a pressurized gas between the layers of the pleura which would cause
the lung to collapse. The theory was to induce a forced rest of the lung. The
artificial pneumothorax could only be performed on one lung at a time and was
not sustained for long periods since the lung would tend to reinflate. The
thoracoplasty perfected later would collapse the rib cage by removing portions
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of the ribs thereby making the pneumothorax more permanent.
Other procedures such as lobectomy and pneumonectomies were developed
as advanced surgical techniques advanced. These techniques would facilitate the
removal of a deceased lung or portions of deceased lungs and relieve some
symptoms in the more serious cases. However, these procedures were not
available to all, nor did they provide a cure for TB. Only with the advent of
modern chemotherapy was a cure for TB found.

3.4 Modern Chemotherapy and the Development of Streptomycin
Research in the late 1800's demonstrated that tuberculocidal agents exist in
fresh unsterile soil. Bacteria, actinomyces or fungi in the soil were identified as
the possible agents. Experiments conducted in Europe had TB patients inhale
these microbes, where others injected the microbes randomly into rabbits.
Veudremer, in 1910, injected 200 patients with a extract of a fungi in Paris. The
results showed evidence that Mycobacteria tuberculosis is sensitive to some
products of fungi. However, the medical community at the time did not exploit
the findings.
Selman Waksman, a soil microbiologist, confirmed the Mycobacteria
tuberculosis consumption process occurring in soil in 1935. Further research by
Waksman was delayed for eight years due to a lack of funding and interest in
the area. In June 1943, Waksman met with representatives from various
pharmaceutical companies, the Saranac Laboratories and the National
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Tuberculosis Association. The scientific interest and financial backing was now
in place for research and development in effective chemotherapy.
Waksman systematically analyzed the various organisms found in soils and
dusts. He concentrated on actinomycese as he had conducted research in this
area as an undergraduate at Rutgers and as a graduate student at the University
of California. Waksman and his staff isolated several antibiotics from specimens
during his research; however, they were found to be too toxic when administered
to laboratory animals. Finally, in September 1943, streptomycin (SM) was
isolated and was found to be less toxic than previous strains. Streptomycin was
used in the control of various infections and was confirmed to be effective
against TB in humans at the Mayo Clinic.
Clinical tests were conducted in 1944 in conjunction with the Merck
Company and the Mayo Clinic. The clinical results confirmed that streptomycin
was effective against TB with a low toxicity to man. In 1947, the drug was
marketed nationwide for use against TB. The death rate decreased and the end
of TB could now be foreseen; however, Waksman warned the medical
community that resistant strains of TB would develop and additional antibiotics
would be needed.

3.5 Other Antibiotics
The development of additional antibiotics was necessitated soon after the
distribution of streptomycin for several reasons. Streptomycin did not kill the
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medications available, home treatment could now be seriously considered.
Other antibiotics developed included pyrazinamide (PZA), ethambutol
(EMB), ethionamide, capreomycin and kanamycin. When given in varying
combinations and dose regimens, existing TB cases were cured and new cases
decreased. Typically sputum would clear of AFB within six months if the
suggested treatment regimen was followed. Few drug resistant strains developed
as a result of using multiple antibiotics and increased public awareness.
However, resistant strains have developed in this decade as a result of
inappropriate treatment overseas, the spread of the HIV virus and a weakening
of the health care infrastructure. These resistant strains proved to be most
difficult to cure and may require even more powerful antibiotics to combat
them.

3.6 Multidrug Resistant Tuberculosis
Between 1990 and 1992, the CDC studied several outbreaks of MRTB that were
isolated within hospitals or correctional facilities. One strain in particular was
found to be resistant to seven antibiotics. Typically, these outbreaks were found
in persons that were HIV positive, or in health care workers who cared for the
patients (20).
The pathology and mode of transmission of MRTB vs TB are the same.
However, MRTB tends to remain infectious for longer periods, as resistance to
treatment is initially unknown. Only through invitro cultures could the actual
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resistance be measured and the appropriate treatment selected. This culturing
may take several weeks, which leaves the susceptibility of the bacteria to the
initial course of medication in question during this period.
The CDC recognized the potential danger of MRTB strains developing and
recently revised their recommendations regarding the initial treatment regimes
for TB. As shown in Table 4, one of four options is recommended.

Table 4 Regiment Options for Initial Treatment of TB Among Children and
Adults
OPTION 1
OPTION 2
OPTION 3
Administer daily INH, Administer daily INH, Treat by DOT, 3 times
RIF, and PZA for 8 RIF, PZA, and SM or /week with INH, RIF,
weeks followed by 16 EMB for 2 weeks PZA, and EMB or SM
weeks of INH and RIF followed b y 2 for 6 months...
daily or 2-3 times a times /week
week.... EMB or SM administration of the
should be added to the same drug for 6 weeks,
initial regiment until and subsequently, with
susceptibility to INH 2 times/week
and
RIF
i s administration of
demonstrated. administration of INH
Continue treatment for and RIF for 16 weeks...
at least 6 months and 3
months beyond culture
conversion...

TB with HIV
Options 1,2,3 can be
used, but treatment
regimens should
continue for a total of
9 months and at least 6
months beyond culture
conversion.

Source: Center for Disease Control. 1993. "Initial Therapy for Tuberculosis in
the Era of Multidrug Resistance Recommendations of the Advisory
Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis" Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report. 42 RR-7.

Each option includes the recommendation that a TB medical expert be
consulted if the patient remains symptomatic or has AFB positive sputum
smears after three months of treatment.
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Noncompliance with medications has been recognized as a leading cause of
MRTB. The CDC recommended that patient needs, living conditions,
employment status and personal preferences be considered when deciding if
direct observed therapy (DOT) should be utilized. DOT is more typically
applied in lower socio-economic classes where the availability of a stable life
style may not be possible because of homelessness or unemployment. Typical
settings where DOT is administered are at TB clinics, community health clinics,
migrant clinics, homeless shelters, prisons, nursing homes, drug treatment
centers, hospitals, HIV/AIDS clinics, and occupational health clinics (10).

3.7 Summary
Waksman summarized in his book The Conquest of Tuberculosis published in
1964, the five stages that occurred in the search for the cure a TB:
1.. The health resort era where patients would convalesce at
sanitoriums typically located in a country atmosphere or in pine
forests where the patients could inhale fresh air was the first
stage.
2. The bed rest era initially rested the lung, then slowly exercised
the patient to a level where they could at least perform to a
level of limited activity.
3. The collapsing theory era provided the means to induce rest on
effected lungs by a pneumothorax.
4. The resection era followed where removal of the effected area
of the lung was accomplished by lobectomy or resection.
5. The chemotherapy era evolved providing effective treatment
and the ultimate decline and cure of TB. (4)
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Advances in technology or understanding would cause the advancement to
the next phase. Each of these five eras overlapped in some degree as
acceptance to the next stage was gained. Usually, patient prognosis would
improve with each development; however, with a new era of increasing infection
rates, this may not be the case. If Waksman were to propose his theory today,
would he include MRTB?

CHAPTER 4

TRANSMISSION PREVENTION

4.1 Historic Methods
Debate ensued within the medical community as to the cause and
communicability of TB, even after Koch's isolation and identification of the
Mycobacterium tuberculosis. As late as 1952, some still believed that heredity
played a major role in a person's relative susceptibility to TB. One of the
earliest published commentaries regarding the highly contagious nature of TB
was Girolamo Fracastoro's book De Morbis Contagiosis published in 1546 (4).
Girolamo cited the analogy that TB was transmitted like a seed, remaining
virulent for great lengths of time on the beds, clothing, and in rooms of phthisis
patients. Girolamo proposed the use of caustics as a disinfectant wherever
possible to destroy these seeds. Although he gave the virulence of TB more
credit than warranted, his theory was the most contemporary of the day. Even
the Bible describes the infectious nature of some diseases and the necessity for
the burning or destruction of clothing and dwellings that contagious patients
occupied.
Sylvius, later in the sixteenth century, more accurately described the
infectious nature of TB. He cautioned that those brought close to the air
expired through the nose or mouth of consumptive patients may become
36
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infected. Those in close contact were advised to "protect themselves against
those who are afflicted" (21). In 1720, Benjamin Marten proposed that TB may
be caused by "minute, living creatures". Marten indicated that casual contact
should not be feared, but close association with a consumptive patient where
"drawing in part of the breath he emits" should be avoided (22). Although many
of the theories were widely published during their time, factions within the
medical community chose not to heed the warnings and the number of
physicians and scientists who became afflicted with TB were numerous.
The potential communicability of TB was recognized by some national and
local authorities. The earliest and most progressive measures taken to prevent
further contamination within the general population were enacted in Southern
Europe. In the Republic of Lucca, laws were enacted in 1699 which required
the names of those infected to be reported, to permit disinfectant measures to
be taken and to destroy certain possessions upon the patient's death. Physicians
were required to perform autopsies upon death and families were advised to
leave the front door open to allow an exchange of fresh air. All utensils,
clothing and bedding were to be cleaned with lye. The rooms of consumptive
patients were to be cleaned thoroughly and freshly painted upon death (4).
In England, the tuberculosis dispensary system was founded in 1887. It was
realized that TB patients who were released from sanitoria would soon relapse
upon returning home. The dispensary provided a location where the patient
could be given minor treatment instead of returning to the sanatorium. Nurses
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were trained to visit the patient at home and recommend changes in life style
which might improve their medical condition. By visiting the home, the nurse
could also monitor the health of other family members of the household and
facilitate rapid recognition and treatment of TB should anyone become infected.
In 1911, when the National Health Insurance Act was enacted in England,
the numbers of new tuberculosis dispensaries increased significantly. The
appointment of Tuberculosis Officers to monitor and administer TB care in a
regional manner also solidified the efforts of the nation.
One of the more encompassing laws was passed in Italy in 1782. Salvatore
de Rensi recounted the following:
1.That household goods not susceptible of contamination shall
immediately be cleansed and that which is susceptible shall at
once be burned and destroyed.
2. That the authorities make an inventory of the clothing in the
patients room to be identified after his death; and if any
opposition shall be made the person doing so, if he belongs to
the lower class shall have three years in the galleys or in
prison, and if of the nobility, three years in the castle and a
penalty of three hundred ducats.
3. The physician shall report a consumptive patient when
ulceration of the lungs has been establish under penalty of
three hundred ducats for the first offence and banishment for
ten years for repetition of it.
4. That the authorities themselves shall tear out and replaster the
house from cellar to garret, carry away and burn the wooded
doors and windows and put in new ones.
5. That the poor sick shall at once be removed to a hospital.
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6. That newly built houses shall not be inhabited within one year
after their completion and six months after the plastering has
been done and everything about the building operation has
been finished.
7. Superintendents of hospitals must keep clothing and linens for
use of consumptive patients in a separate place. (21)

4.2 The United States Public Health Service
Much of the early organized work in the United States regarding the eradication
of TB was performed by voluntary organizations and later by official agencies.
The National Tuberculosis Association, one of the oldest voluntary health
organizations, worked closely with the United States Public Health Service. The
Public Health Service formed the Surgeon General's Task Force on Tuberculosis
Control in 1963. Both agencies recognized the complexity involved in the
eradication of TB within the United States. The stubbornness of the TB
bacteria was the major cause. TB will often remain dormant for long periods
and exhibit no symptoms until in advanced stages, thus providing a longer
period for the illness to spread among others.
With the stubbornness of TB in mind, the Public Health Service in the early
1960's recommended a two point approach at first. The first recommendation
was to aggressively combat existing infections and achieve the maximum number
of cures as possible. Second, dormant TB should not be allowed to develop into
active TB by providing prophylactic treatment and requiring follow up by
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regional health authorities for those individuals classified at greatest risk.
The systematic elimination of TB in children was recommended in order to
reduce the epidemic. TB skin testing of all children upon entering school and
investigating all family contacts of children who tested positive was
recommended. All teachers and school employees also had to be tested
annually, and those testing positive should subsequently have chest X-rays taken.
To prevent the spread of TB among adolescents, recommendations were
made that all children of fourteen years of age should be screened for TB. The
adult population was to be screened by a chest X-ray when admission into a
general hospital in urban centers was required for any illness. The annual cost
for this two point plan and its screening procedures was estimated at
approximately 65 billion dollars.
A program of this nature would need to be continued for a minimum of ten
years. Six recommendations were made to achieve this goal:
1.. The United States Public Health Service should allocate the
funding to all programs on a sliding scale.
2. All services should be provided without discrimination with
regards to ability to pay or legal residence of the patient.
3. Funds should be provided by the way of teaching fellowships
to medical schools in the areas of medicine and nursing to
improve professional skill levels.
4. A system utilizing the most current technology should be
established to provide a accurate record keeping method
regarding TB infections.
5. Manner in which to finance the previous two items.
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6. The continuation of the study of the epidemiologic outbreaks
with regards to geographic location and frequency should be
continued. (23)
The public health programs of the 1950's and 60's met with success, as
shown by the decline of new TB cases. However, outbreaks of additional cases
in the mid 1980's may have been a result of decreased funding for combatting
TB. Unfortunately the impact of budget cuts ten years ago are being offset by
increased expenditures required in the present decade. Today, disease control
on the Federal level continues through the US Department of Health and
Human Services, via the Public Health Service's Centers for Disease Control in
Atlanta.

43 Occupation Exposure Control
The responsibility for occupational exposure control, research, regulation and
enforcement in the United States falls upon the Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Department
Health and Human Service's National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH). The reports of various MRTB outbreaks and the
occupational exposure of 16 health care works to MRTB resulting in the death
of at least five workers, prompted OSHA to develop a policy regarding TB
exposure. In May 1992, OSHA Region II in conjunction with the NY State
Public Employee Safety Act and Health Program, developed guidelines for the
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enforcement of TB exposure regulations. The guidelines provided OSHA
compliance officers information regarding their own protection during
inspections as well as procedures for the inspection process itself. Many
questions arose from this document, promoting the drafting of a memorandum

to regional administrators in October 1993 clarifying OSHA's intent. These
recommendations are to be enforced as a minimum in those states which have
their own OSHA programs.
The ability to enforce tuberculosis exposure regulations on employers is
promulgated under several Federal laws. Employer responsibilities are cited in
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Sections which have been
applied to TB exposure enforcement include: the General Duty Provision section

5(a)(1); Accident Signs and Tags 29 CFR 1.910.145; Respiratory Protection 29 CFR
1910.134 ; Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records 29 CFR 1910.20 and
Log and Summary of Occupational Injuries and Illness 29 CFR 1904. The CDC
document entitled Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of Tuberculosis in
Health Care Settings with Special Focus on HIV Related Issues has been used as
a widely accepted standard by OSHA.

The General Duty Provision of the OSHA Act is applicable since TB is a
recognized health hazard and feasible abatement methods exist. Citations will
be issued by OSHA to employers at certain facilities classified by the CDC
where higher incidence of TB exposures have occurred. Occupational exposure
is said to occur by two types of methods. First, exposure may occur when the
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possibility of inhaling the exhaled air of an individual with suspected TB or
confirmed TB exists. A suspected case may be assumed, when the patient has
the symptoms of a productive cough, coughing up blood, weight loss, loss of
appetite, weakness and night sweats from fever. The second type of exposure
occurs during high risk procedures where an infected or potentially infected
individual has a high probability of producing airborne respiratory secretions.
The Respiratory Protection Regulations of 29 CFR 1910.134 require the
guarding of employees against airborne health hazards. The legislation is
primarily concerned with the provision of respirators for the workers; however,
engineering control measures such as improved ventilation are recommended to
be utilized first where feasible. The CDC recommends that particulate
respirators should be used when entering rooms of individuals with suspected
or confirmed cases of TB or when performing high hazard procedures like
aerosolizing medication, bronchoscopy, sputum induction, endotracheal
intubation, suctioning, autopsies and when emergency medical personnel
transport an individual with suspected or confirmed TB. Respirators must be
NIOSH approved high efficiency particulate air respirators (HEPA). Disposable
respirators may be reused if their structural and functional integrity are
maintained. A program which includes training in the proper use and care of
the respirator must also be established.
Warning signs shall be posted as per requirements of 29 CFR 1910.145
Accident Prevention Sign and Tags. The sign shall be prominently displayed and
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be posted outside all AFB isolation rooms. The message typically shall warn of
"SPECIAL RESPIRATORY ISOLATION", or "AFB ISOLATION", or provide
other similar warning.
Employee exposure and medical records shall be maintained as per 29 CFR
1910.20 Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records. A record of TB
testing and results shall be maintained and a subsequent evaluation or treatment
provided must also be recorded. These records shall also be provided to the
OSHA compliance officer on request under 29 CFR 1913.10
TB infections and positive TB skin tests should be reported on the OSHA
200 Log as per 29 CFR 1904, Log and Summary of Occupational Injuries and
Illness. All routine baseline testing evaluations with positive results should be
reported on the 200 Log with the exception of pre-employment testing. Should
active TB develop after a positive skin test, the log should be updated to include
this information but a new entry should not be made so as to avoid double
counting.
TB compliance inspections will occur as a result of employee complaints or
be included as part of routine industrial hygiene compliance inspection. These
inspections will occur at facilities identified by the CDC as having the greatest
incidence of infections among workers. Such locations include health care
settings, correctional institutions, homeless shelters, long term care facilities for
the elderly and drug treatment centers.

CHAPTER 5

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

5.1 Introduction
Administrative controls are the least desirable type to utilize in the occupational
health and safety field since they do not act passively as engineering controls,
but require active participation by the individuals involved. However, in the
prevention of occupational exposure to TB the use of administrative controls is
essential as it provides a basis to identify those infected and to initiate the other
forms of exposure control. The education of health care workers to recognize
early signs and symptoms of active TB is essential to prevent needless exposure
to airborne TB bacilli prior to a clinical diagnosis of TB. When identified, the
patient may be placed on isolation procedures if active TB is suspected. Patient
education, employee medical surveillance, pre-employment screening, isolation
guidelines, early detection, employee education and follow up of patient contacts
are all administrative controls which should be included in a facilities infection
control plan.

5.2 Screening for Early Detection and Preventative Therapy
The ideal scenario is to detect latent TB and prevent the needless exposure to
airborne TB bacilli before it develops to a point where it becomes contagious
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Table 5 Criteria for Preventative Therapy
Age group (years)
Category

<35

≥35

With risk factor*
≥5 mm

Treat all ages if reaction to 5 TU PPD ≥10 mm (or
patient is recent contact, HIV infected, or has
radiographic evidence of old TB

No risk factor
High-incidence groupt

Treat if PPD ≥10 mm!

Do not Treat

No risk factor
Low-incidence group

Treat if PPD ≥15 mm++

Do not treat

* Risk factors include HIV infection, recent contact with infectious person, recent
skin test conversion, abnormal chest radiograph, intravenous drug abuse, and
certain medical risk factors.
t High incidence groups include foreign born persons, medically undeserved low
income populations and residence of long term care facilities.
Lower or higher cut off points may be used for identifying positive reactions,
depending on the relative prevalence of TB infection and non specific crossreactivity in the population
I Measurement in millimeters of induration (upwelling or hardening, approximate
size of a of pencil eraser)
Source: Center for Disease Control. 1990. "The Use of Preventative Therapy for
Tuberculosis Infection in the United States" Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report. 39 RR-8.
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to others. The CDC estimates that approximately 10 to 15 million persons in
the United States may be latently infected with TB (11). Efforts made to identify
and treat the latently infected through the use of Mantoux skin testing of high
risk groups has been attempted. If early detection indicates the presence of TB,
preventative treatment by oral antibiotics may be indicated. Usually, treatment
may be completed at home or given on an out patient basis at a local clinic.
Only the most serious cases would be admitted to a hospital where continuous
medical monitoring would be required. Currently the CDC recommends that
a preventative therapy of INH be given. Dose ranges are from 10 mg/kg per
day for children to 300 mg daily for adults for a duration of 6 to 12 months. The
CDC established the criteria shown in Table 5 to aid physicians in determining
if preventative therapy is warranted.
Patients treated at home would be educated to the importance of taking
their medication regularly in order to prevent a resistant strain of TB or
symptomatic disease from developing. Follow up exams would be conducted
monthly to insure compliance with medication and to identify the presence of
active TB should it develop.

5.3 Education and Training of Health Care Workers
When left undetected, those of lower socio-economic classes will often develop
the clinical signs and symptoms of active TB and seek treatment at a busy
hospital emergency room. In order to prevent these unrecognized exposures
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from occurring, health care workers should be well versed in the signs and
symptoms of TB. The early identification of a potentially infectious person is
still paramount to the success of any infection control program. Much the same
way that early medicine classified TB within a group of similar illnesses, the
same occurs today as signs and symptoms may be mistaken for other diseases
like pneumonia or bronchitis. The recognition of the potential for infectious TB
to exist in a patient entering a health care facility must be established. When
identified, appropriate isolation measures should be taken as to prevent the
nosocomial transmission of the disease and physicians should order the
appropriate diagnostic tests to confirm the clinical diagnosis.

Once the

diagnostic tests are completed and the results returned, the decision may be
made if the patient is required to remain in AFB isolation.
The clinical findings and pathology of TB is taught in medical and nursing
schools. The decline of new cases within the United States in the past decades
may have caused the medical community to be less suspicious of TB infections
in some communities. Within the past five years numerous papers have been
published in medical journals discussing the resurgence of MRTB and its
association with HIV. Those employed in high risk urban settings have, of
necessity, become familiar with the clinical signs and hazards associated with TB.
Therefore inservice education should be provided to familiarize medical
personnel of the signs and symptoms of TB, infection control policies and
isolation procedures.

Additional training regarding the use of personal
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protection equipment and the condition of the physical plant to isolate patients
should be reviewed.

5.3.1 Recognition of Signs and Symptoms
The Center for Disease Control recommends the diagnosis of active TB should
be vigorously pursued for those patients who demonstrate the clinical signs and
symptoms. Those patients (particularly those belonging to high risk groups)
which exibit a persistent cough, weight loss, anorexia and fever should be
considered suspect TB cases until further clinical testing proves otherwise.
Diagnostic tests ordered for suspected TB patients should include a PPD skin
test, chest X-ray and microscopic examination of sputum cultures for AFB's.
The history and physical exam by the physician should reveal if the patient is a
member of a high risk group or has been exposed to an individual who is a
member of a high risk group.
Ironically, one risk group that has had increased outbreaks of TB is also
more difficult to diagnose as having TB. HIV positive patients often will have
a normal chest X-ray without the presence of cavitation, and the percentage of
false negatives associated with the PPD skin testing has also increased as the
HIV disease progresses in an individual (8). For this reason, those who are
known to be HIV positive are considered to have TB positive skin tests if the
updwelling is greater than five mm as opposed to the ten mm for non HIV
persons.
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As of this date, the only method to positively confirm the presence of
pulmonary TB is through culture examination of sputum samples. This process
may take several weeks; however, new technologies are being developed which
would provide a more rapid identification such as radiometric and genetic
probes. Isolation procedures should not be withheld until lab results return for
those suspected to have a high level of communicability of the illness. Patients
treated for other respiratory maladies who did not respond to therapy should
be considered as suspected TB infected and have the appropriate tests ordered
and treatment initiated. If the patient had not been previously placed on
isolation procedures, they should be implemented immediately.

5.3.2 Evaluation of Infection Communicability
Once a suspected case of TB is presumed, the health care provider must
determine the level of communicability. A patient found to be infected with TB
after testing positive to a skin test after routine screening, who has no symptoms
or productive cough is obviously less contagious (if at all) than a symptomatic
patient with a productive cough who arrives at a hospital emergency room
because of shortness of breath. For this reason, a heightened level of suspicion
should be maintained when initially triaging patients entering the emergency
department. Proper intial placement of the patient may substantially decrease
the unrecognized exposure of the staff and other patients alike.
The Center for Disease Control has established a list of eight criteria to help
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determine the communicability of TB as related by the number of potentially
airborne bacilli expelled. These factors are:
1. Anatomic site of disease (pulmonary or laryngeal TB,
extrapulmonry site which includes a open lesion in which
concentration of organisms is high or non pulmonary disease
located in the respiratory tract.
2. Presence of cough or other forceful expirational maneuvers.
3. Presence of AFB in the sputum smears.
4. Willingness or ability of the patient to cover his mouth when
coughing.
5. Presence of cavitation on the chest radiograph.
6. Length of time the patient has been on adequate
chemotherapy.
7. Duration of symptoms.
8. Administration of procedures that can enhance coughing. (8)
The most contagious of patients are those with a productive cough, positive
AFB smears and cavitation. Patients who respond to chemotherapy usually
become less infectious within two to three weeks. For health care workers
treating these patients, isolation procedures should be utilized until the sputum
smears show fewer bacilli and the cough decreases. However, some patients
remain highly infectious for the length of the illness and must remain isolated
for longer periods. Each case must be reviewed individually as no two patients
are alike. The above criteria are to be only used as a guideline for determining
the infectiousness.
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5.3.3 Isolation Procedures
Protocols should be established for the criteria required to isolate potentially
infectious TB patients. Typically, these procedures should be immediately
imposed on patient's with suspected TB.

Patients requiring isolation and

admission to the hospital should be admitted to private rooms. When available,
isolation rooms with special ventilation systems should be utilized. The patient
should be instructed not to leave the room unless wearing an approved mask.
The patient may be instructed to wear appropriate masks even when occupying
the isolation room except when eating or drinking. Those caring for contagious
TB patients must also wear approved personal respirators when occupying the
same room. Visitors should be limited to family who have been instructed on
isolation procedures and training on use of the appropriate respirator.
Isolation rooms should be well identified with signs stating "AFB
ISOLATION" or "SPECIAL RESPIRATORY ISOLATION". Visitors should
be required to stop at the nursing station for any special instructions prior to
entering the room. Those exposed to patient body fluids should follow the
appropriate precautions for blood borne pathogens. The appropriate gloves,
face shields and gowns should be worn when appropriate. OSHA Bloodborne
Pathogens Standard CFR 1910.1030 shown in Appendix C of this document
outline the requirements for protection from infectious fluids and substances.
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5.4 High Hazard Procedures
The CDC has recognized several medical procedures which are potentially high
risk ones for the medical professional to perform without being exposed to
respiratory tract secretions. Special recommendations have been provided to
insure that the health care provider is protected from these potentially infectious
secretions.
Diagnostic sputum induction is used to collect deep sputum samples to test
for AFB or other culture examinations. The patient is instructed to inhale and
exhale deeply three times, then inhale swiftly and cough forcefully and
expectorate into a sputum container. This technique allows only the deepest
secretions and potentially the most contagious to be expectorated. The patient
should be instructed to cover his mouth and nose and when he coughs during
the procedure to further limit bacilli from entering the room air. The ideal
setting for this procedure is in a special negative pressure ventilation booth or
isolation room. The patient should remain in that area until any residual
coughing has been resolved after the procedure. The health care worker,
typically a nurse should wear an approved personal respirator if required to be
in attendance during the procedure.
Patients receiving aerosolized medication via nebulizer are also subject to
expelling bacilli into the air. Several medications are given in this manner
requiring the patient to deeply inhale and exhale in order to absorb the
medication deeply into the lungs. Typically these procedures are also conducted
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in special booths or isolation rooms. Personal respirators should be worn by the
health care worker if in close proximity. Bronchoscopy, endotracheal intubation
and endotracheal suctioning should also be conducted in areas which have the
appropriate ventilation. These procedures often cause the patient to cough
forcefully, creating the possible expulsion of TB bacilli during and after the
procedure, thus requiring the necessity for masks and eye protection to be
utilized by those in contact with the patient.

5.5 Medical Surveillance
The maintenance of medical surveillance of the employees of health care
facilities cannot be mitigated. The benefits are two fold: the pre-employment
PPD screening identifies the base line result of the employees's TB status and
second, it serves as a means to screen personnel during employment and control
outbreaks.
Initial pre-employment Mantoux skin testing should be conducted for all
employees at the initial physical exam. Annual testing should be provided at no
cost to employees whose responsibilites include patient contact.

Those

individuals who have high risk exposure by caring for known TB patients should
be tested biannually. Employees previously found to have tested positive to a
PPD test, or who are currently receiving oral antibiotc TB treatment may be
exempted from annual skin testing. However, these persons should be closely
monitored for the appearance of clinical signs and symptoms should the latent
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TB become active and require treatment.
The data collected on employee and patient outbreaks should be reviewed
frequently to identify and stem any outbreaks within the facility. When
outbreaks occur, exposure control policies should also be reviewed to identify
if new policies should be established, or existing policies modified or more
rigidly enforced.

Special testing should be provided for those employees who had contact with
patients who were found to have contagious TB, but were not on AFB isolation.
A Mantoux test should be administered immediately to the employee upon

discovery of the unprotected exposure and repeated twelve weeks later. When
indurations greater than five mm occur or the signs and symptoms of TB are
present, a chest X-ray should be taken. For those employees who test positive,

preventative therapy should begin immediately and counseling regarding HIV
antibody testing provided, as TB has been found more frequently in HIV
positive persons.
Work restrictions should be evaluated on a case by case basis as to the
communicability potential of the employee. Those with infectious TB should be
permitted to return to work only after the cough is resolved and the sputum is
free of bacilli on smears conducted in three consecutive days. The employee

should be closely monitored regarding the recurrence of symptoms and
completion of prescribed treatments.

Those refusing to complete the

preventative therapy and who are otherwise healthy may still return to work, but
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should be counseled as to the possible occurrence of a drug resistant strain of
TB (8).
Employee medical records should be maintained as per 29 CFR 1910.20
Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records.

Records of treatment

provided and PPD test results should be documented. The OSHA 200 log must
be regularly updated for positive PPD tests which occur during employment.
Positive tests occurring at the time of the pre-employment screening are not
considered as an occupational exposure and need not be logged. Only those
employees who initially tested negative and then test positive PPD during
employment should be documented. If active TB develops, the initial log entry
of positive testing should be updated. A new entry should not be made so as
to avoid double counting.
All outbreaks of communicable diseases are reportable to the local Boards
of Health as the law requires. The Board of Health will identify and notify
suspected exposure contacts. The infection control personnel at the appropriate
facility should assist the authorities with information regarding known contacts.

5.6 Summary
The CDC has recognized the importance of the administrative regulations
required to prevent the spread of TB. In the CDC document entitled Guidelines
for Prevention of Transmission of Tuberculosis in Health Care Settings, seven
fundamentals are cited to reduce the transmission of TB.
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1. Screening patients for active TB and TB infection.
2. Providing rapid diagnostic services.
3. Prescribing appropriate curative and preventative therapy.
4. Maintaining physical measures to reduce microbial
contamination of air.
5. Providing isolation rooms for persons with, or suspected of,
having infectious TB.
6. Screening health care facility personnel for TB infection and
TB.
7. Promptly investigating and controlling outbreaks. (8)

All but items four and five may be considered as administrative controls. The
provision of isolation rooms and the physical measures to reduce contamination
of the air will be discussed in the next two chapters Personal Protective
Equipment and Engineering Controls.

CHAPTER 6

PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

6.1 Airborne TB Hazards
Tuberculosis is primarily transmitted via the airborne route, although blood
borne exposures have occurred. Microscopic aerosols of one to five microns in
diameter may remain airborne and travel on air currents for long periods within
a facility (10).

Administrative controls play an important role in the

identification of suspected or infected persons and placement of the patient on
isolation procedures. Most outbreaks of nosocomial transmission of TB
occurred as a result of contact with patients with unrecognized TB.
Transmissions occurred between patient to patient and also patient to health
care worker in one study (20). The personal respirator serves as the only
protection before the patient is placed in an isolation room. This is the last line
of protection against infectious pulmonary TB occupying an AFB isolation
room.
As with all types respiratory exposures, the likelihood of contracting TB is
related to the concentration of the bacilli in the air and the duration of the
exposure by the health care worker. Theoretically, only one TB microbe need
be inhaled to contract TB and the probability of this occurring increases as the
concentration of the microbes is increased. Administrative controls are utilized
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to identify those infected with the bacteria, and placing the patient in isolation
to reduce these concentrations by the other types of controls.

Engineering

controls attempt to alter the path of the bacilli by exhausting or filtering the
room air thereby reducing their concentration. The use of personnel protective
equipment, i.e., personal respirators (PR) constitute receiver control as they do
not alter the path but only protect the wearer, provided they are utilized
properly and worn at the appropriate times.
The CDC guidelines for wearing a PR when possible TB exposure occurs
in three circumstances:
1. When entering rooms housing individuals with suspected or
confirmed infectious TB.
2. When employees perform high hazard procedures on
individuals who have suspected or confirmed TB disease.
Examples of high hazard procedures include aerosolized
medication treatment, bronchoscopy, sputum induction,
endotracheal intubation, suctioning procedures and autopsies.
3. When emergency medical response personnel or others must
transport, in a closed vehicle, an individual with suspected or
confirmed TB. (8)
The PR's utilized must be NIOSH approved high efficiency particulate air
(HEPA) respirators as a minimum standard.

6.1.1 Particulate Respirators

Although the CDC guidelines are vague with respect to the type of personal
respirator to be utilized, OSHA requires HEPA respirators be provided as the
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minimum protection under 29 CFR 1910.134. A respirator protection program
must also be established at the facility under the same code. Because TB is
considered a biological hazard, there is no permissible exposure limit (PEL)
defined, as any exposure is considered hazardous.

NIOSH therefore

recommends that powered air-purified respirators (PAPR) be utilized for a
minimum protection level. However, OSHA recognized that PAPR's could
interfere with patient care and therefore authorized the use of HEPA

respirators as an acceptable standard. Both devices utilize paper element HEPA
filtration; however, the PAPR is equipped with a powered fan which blows
filtered air into the face piece of the user to provide further protection by

positive pressurization.
This option to authorize HEPA respirators by OSHA was justified for
several reasons. There is no published data regarding the efficiency of HEPA
in filtering TB; however, tests have been conducted by NIOSH for particulate

matter associated with a similar diameter. The aerosolized mycobacteria
tuberculosis ranges in diameter from one to five microns. Tests conducted in
the three respirator classes of dust/mist, dust/mist/fume and HEPA indicated
that only the HEPA filter met the filtering requirements of particulate matter

similar in diameter to TB in low concentration environments.
The typical surgical mask utilized in many hospital settings is not approved
for employee use for protection against TB. Although the cup shaped surgical
mask may have a similar appearance to the HEPA mask, the same filtration
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effect or fit will not be achieved. Disposable HEPA PR's may be utilized and
reused if they retain their original cup shape after reuse. The mask may be
fitted with one way valves to release expired air; however this type of mask
would not be appropriate for patient use.
Even the best mask will be ineffective if not worn or fitted properly.

Employee training must be conducted in the use of PR's which includes fit
testing. Either a qualitative fit testing (QLFT) or a quantitative fit testing
(QNFT) technique may be utilized. QLFT relies on the employee to have a

sensory response to a irritant introduced into the proximate atmosphere of the
mask. If the employee has a response to the irritant or "tastes" the test material,
the fit is not considered "tight" and is less effective. Less offensive fumes may
be utilized provided they are similar in diameter to the hazard material.
Common test materials utilized for TB testing would be either aerosolized
sodium saccharin at three microns in diameter or isoamyl acetate. QLFT is a
fast, inexpensive and relatively easy to perform test; however, it relies upon a
subjective response by the individual being tested to the test material.
The QNFT requires that the employee be exposed to a detectable non-toxic
atmosphere. The employee dons a respirator fitted with a probe attached to a

special instrument that measures the amount of leakage into the mask. Rather
than a subjective response as required with the QLFT test, the instrument
detects and measures the amount leaked yielding a quantitative fit factor as a
result. Special equipment and training is required to conduct QNFT causing this
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method to be more expensive. A common rule of thumb regarding fit testing
is: the greater the difficulty of inspiration, the "tighter" the fit and the better the
respirator.
Several shortcomings are associated with the use of personal protection
equipment. The hazard is not eliminated by their use, and the receiver would
realize the full effect of the hazard if the PR fails or is not fitted properly. PRs

often are not utilized because they are cumbersome, therefore enforcement
policies must be enacted. Facial hair may drastically effect the fit of the device
on the face requiring the enforcement of grooming codes. Through proper

education and training, the employee is introduced to the hazards of TB and the
importance of using personal respirators.

6.1.2 Respirator Training Program
OSHA requires that respirator training be provided under 29 CFR 1910.134.

The training should include the pathology of TB, its signs and symptoms, a
review of the medical surveillance program, as well as therapies and specific
written protocols in the use of controls. The National Safety Council outlines

a typical respiratory training program as follows:
1. An explanation of the respiratory hazard and what happens if
the respirator is not used properly.

2. A discussion of what engineering and administrative controls
are being used and why respirators must still be used.
3. An explanation why a particular type of respirator is used.
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4. A discussion of the function, capabilities and limitations of the
selected respirator
5. Instructions on how to don the respirator and how to check it's
fit and operation.
6. Instruction of the proper wearing of the respirator.
7. Instruction in respirator maintenance.
8. Instruction in recognizing and handling emergency situations.
9. Instruction as needed for special respirator use.
10.Regulations regarding respirator use. (24)
If facilities are reusing disposable respirators, the training programs should
address the point at which the respirator is considered contaminated or
deformed and must be disposed. Although TB is predominantly transmitted via
the airborne route, employees should be instructed that TB may also be
transmitted by the blood borne route and universal precautions should be used.

6.2 Universal Precautions
The term universal precautions refers to the philosophy that all human body
fluids are considered to be infectious and therefore should be treated with
certain precautions. Originally adopted as a response to HIV and Hepatitis B
(HBV) infections, the universal precautions concept encompass a broad
spectrum that include work practice controls, personal protective equipment and
engineering controls. Since a high percentage of those infected with TB are also
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HIV positive, the use of these standards as promulgated by the Blood Borne
Pathogens Standard CFR 1910.1030 are highly recommended and often required
for all patients regardless of their HIV status. One valuable asset to the
regulations included the requirement of providing a hepatitis vaccination free
of charge to all employees by their employer. Disposal and marking of
regulated biohazard waste, employee education and the use of personal
protective equipment were also included in the regulations.
Personal protective equipment typically includes latex gloves, gowns, masks,
as well as eye or face shields. As a PR is required to be worn by the health care
workers when caring for those infected with TB, these additional items should
be utilized whenever the health care worker reasonably anticipates contact with
body fluids.

Eye protection and gowns are also needed whenever gross

contamination may occur as during autopsies or arterial bleeding control.
The health care worker must always remain suspicious and treat all patients
as if they are infected with a contagious illness. Latex gloves should be worn
when contact with any body fluid is anticipated. Drawing blood, starting IV's,
changing bed pans and handling soiled linen are situations where barrier
protection in the form of gloves should be utilized. Frequent hand washing
after patient or cultural contact has been made also decreases the risk of cross
infection. Accidental needle sticks or splashing of body fluids onto unprotected
health care providers should be reported so that the required prophylactic
treatment or examination may be initiated.
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Figure 3 The Ventilation system at a Viel loge in Salpêtrière, France
Source: Thompson John D. and Goldin Grace. 1975. The Hospital: A Social and
Architectural History. New Haven & London. Yale University Press.

Figure 4 Hospital ward design for Johns Hopkins Hospital, 1875.
Source: Thompson John D. and Goldin Grace. 1975. The Hospital:• A Social and
Architectural History. New Haven & London. Yale University Press.

CHAPTER 7

ENGINEERING CONTROLS

7.1 Introduction
Ventilation within hospitals wards was recognized early in medical practice as
a method to combat the spread of infection and aid in the cure of some
diseases. Florence Nightingale recognized the adverse effects that the poor
natural ventilation provided in her book entitled Notes on Hospitals (25).
Patients were housed in large pavilions and treated in wards with perhaps a
dozen other patients during her time. Ventilation was provided by opening
large windows permitting natural outside breezes to blow through or out a
central vent in the ceiling. More progressive designs allowed for the air currents
within the structure to be drawn into a vaulted attic and out through the
ventilation dome in the roof. Figure 3 shows the ventilation system of smaller
"loges" designed by Charles Francois Viel in France in the 1780's where fresh
air was drawn through the doors and windows and exhausted through the dome
on the roof
Other designs provided a central fireplace which would draw the ward air
up the chimney on warm currents. This fire would burn year round regardless
of weather conditions outside, for ventilation purposes and hot water. Figure
4 shows the floor plan of a hospital ward, note the centrally located fireplace
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and numerous windows between each bed side.
The ventilation within any health care facility serves two basic purposes. First,
the system must protect the patient from the contaminated air of others and
second the system must protect the air supply from an infectious patient. Early
attempts to achieve these measures involved removing highly infectious patients
from the general wards to crude isolated rooms which were freely ventilated.
When isolated rooms were unavailable, infectious patients were often moved
closer to the fire so the infectious vapors could be pulled up the draft through
the chimney (26).
Dr. Stephen Smith of New York realized that patients should be separated
by their degree of contagiousness as well as by sex and age. As the pavilion
style hospital grew and multiple wings were built, each housed one particular
type of patient. Ventilation technology also progressed as hospitals grew. The
Johns Hopkins Hospital built in 1877 utilized several types of ventilation
techniques. One method facilitated the drawing of fresh air from a well
ventilated basement by convection across heated coils mounted on the basement
walls, through a duct venting at the patient's bedside. The foul air in the ward
was removed through vents located under the patient's bed which conveyed the
air through an iron tube mounted across the basement ceiling to the ventilating
chimney. A coil of heated tubing at the end of this vent near the chimney
accelerated the air to provide a draft. A crude heat exchange would occur as
the iron tube warmed the fresh air in the basement without mixing with the foul
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exhausted ward air. In the ceiling of the ward, six 2' x 2' vents leading into a
12" tube conveyed the foul air across the ceiling into the chimney to draw off
the air. These ceiling vents usually remained closed during the winter to retain
the heat.
As the wards were stacked in several stories, the technology to ventilate them
also advanced. The central ventilation chimney still remained with an open fire
but additional ventilation shafts and tubes were constructed in the main chimney

to facilitate the drawing of foul air from the additional wards. Elevators and
other direct shafts between floors were purposely avoided to prevent the
movement of air from ward to ward.
As advances in architecture and mechanical ventilation systems developed,

the hospital evolved into a skyscraper to provide more efficient use of central
services. The Beaujon Hospital constructed in Paris in 1935 was one of the first
skyscrapers built. The central fire and ventilating chimneys once commonplace
in a hospital ward were replaced with mechanical fans and elaborate duct
systems to provide fresh air and exhaust the foul air. At the Beaujon facility,

the TB ward was located at the top of a twelve story structure. Patients could
be placed on sun drenched balconies specially constructed for the sunshine cure
without obstruction from the facade of the building.

As a result of modern ventilation, special rooms could now be constructed
to isolate highly infectious patients. The evolution of central heating and airconditioning now provided rooms with a comfortable environment to convalesce.
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7.2 Modern Ventilation
The move away from natural breezes and thermal drafts to ventilate hospitals
gave way to forced air as developments in mechanical systems were made. The
ability to ventilate areas without reliance on weather conditions allowed the
interior design of hospitals to change and permitted the construction of
windowless central areas. Specialized ventilation systems would provide clean
air for the operating theater and exhaust the harmful fumes from labs and
isolation rooms.
A ventilation system may be utilized to heat, cool and supply make-up air
or remove a contaminant to improve air quality. The simplest system consists
of an air moving device, (a fan) and a distribution system (a duct). Humidifiers,
air conditioning, heaters, air cleaning and filtering devices may be added to
upgrade the simplest system. Typical temperature ranges within a hospital are
maintained between 68 and 80°F with a 30 to 60% relative humidity.
A modern hospital ventilation system must be able to complete the following
four criteria:
1. heating and cooling
2. contamination removal
3. contamination dilution
4. make-up air supply (27)
When these criteria are achieved, and the system is well maintained it will
protect the patients from exposure to contaminated air and also protect the
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hospital from its contaminated patients. In order to understand what is entailed
in a simple ventilation system a brief discussion of some basic principals is
required.
The movement of air by a ventilation system requires an expenditure of
energy. This energy is transformed into wind velocity which may be measured
by means of the increase in pressure across two points. Both kinetic and
potential energy are the components of this pressure. The energy relationship
is expressed as in equation 7.1 below.

TP = Total Pressure
SP = Static Pressure
VP = Velocity Pressure
1 & 2 are measurement points, 2 being down stream
Static pressure is defined as a force which is said to "blow" in a duct in a
positive pressure system; or the force to "collapse" a duct in a negative pressure

system. Velocity pressure is the energy that causes air in the system to flow
much like kinetic energy. Static pressure is easily measured by tapping a duct
with a manometer and directly reading the pressure. Total pressure is measured

by use of an impact tube which allows direct reading of the pressure value. The
velocity pressure may be calculated from equation 7.1 or directly determined

with the use of a picot tube. Once the VP is known it may be converted into
the more functional value of velocity by the following relationship shown in
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equation 7.2.

V = Velocity (feet per second)
VP = Velocity Pressure (inches of water)
The velocity may also be measured directly with thermal anemometers. With
this value now calculated, the air flow in the duct can be measured by equation
7.3.

Q = Air Flow (cubic feet per minute)
A = Area of Duct (square fret)
V = Air Velocity (feet per minute)

Once the air flow in the duct is known, the existing capacity and effectiveness
of a hospital system may be determined. The dilution and removal rates of
room air are expressed in air changes per hour by dividing the value calculated
as air flow, by the room volume and multiplying by 60.

7.2.1 Dilution and Removal
Most industrial ventilation systems were designed without the removal of
contaminants as a design criteria. Recent concerns about indoor air quality
have prompted consideration of this factor during design and subsequent
application of the technology required. Today, most new ventilation systems
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Table 6 Contaminant Removal Efficiencies per Air Changes per Hour

Air Changes/hr
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
25
30
35
40
45
50

Mins. required for a removal efficiency of
99.9%
99%
90%
414
276
138
138
207
69
92
138
46
69
104
35
55
83
28
69
23
46
59
39
20
52
35
17
15
46
31
14
41
28
38
13
25
35
12
23
11
21
32
10
20
30
9
28
18
9
17
26
8
16
24
8
23
15
15
22
7
7
21
14
6
11
17
5
9
14
8
4
12
3
7
10
3
9
6
8
6
3

Source: Center for Disease Control. 1990. "Guidelines for Preventing the
Transmission of TB in Health Care Settings" Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report. 39 RR-17.
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provide some type of mechanism to insure the quality of the indoor air,
particularly in closed buildings like modern office buildings or skyscrapers.
One of the simplest methods to achieve this goal is by dilution. Dilution
provides addition of fresh uncontaminated air into the ventilation system rather
than recirculating the same air. A percentage of the stale air is exhausted
outside, while the remaining is mixed with fresh intake air. The objective of this
technique is to reduce the level of concentration of a contaminant or toxin to
acceptable threshold limit values (TLV's in ppm). A mathematical model shown
in equation 7.4 does exist to calculate the required ventilation rate given a value
for the TLV assuming the returning air is free of contaminants.

Q = Ventilation Rate (cubic feet per minute) a = Specific Gravity
ER = Evaporation Rate (pt/hr) MW = Molecular Weight
K = Safety Factor
As with all biological hazards, the TLV for TB is zero, meaning that there
is no acceptable level, and all contaminants must be removed, making equation
7.4 inapplicable. Special systems which exhaust all room air to the outside for
isolation rooms containing biohazards like TB. Tabulations have been made
regarding the efficiency of air borne contaminants removed as expressed in air
changes per hour. Table 6 shows the theoretical data assuming perfect mixing
of air as presented by the CDC in their Guidelines for TB Prevention.
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Table 7 Selected Pressure & Ventilation Relationships of Hospital Areas
Pressure
Relationships
to Adjacent
Areas
Functional Space
Surgery and Critical Care
Operating room
(all outdoor air)
(recirculating air)
Delivery room
(all outdoor air)
(recirculating air)
E
Recovery room
P
Nursery suite
P
Trauma room t
Nursing
±
Patient room*
N
Toilet room
P
Intensive care
±
Isolation
±
Isolation alcove++
E
Labor and delivery
E
Patient Corridor*
Ancillary
N
Lab, general
N
Lab, bacteriological
N
Lab, pathology
N
Autopsy
Diagnostic and Treatment
±
Exam room*
Medication room
P
-4Treatment room*
Service
Laundry
N
Soiled linen sorting
N

Minimum
Air Changes
Of Outdoor
Air per Hour

Minimum
Total Air
Changes per
Hour

Recirculated
All Air
Exhausted Within
Directly to
Room
Outdoors
Units

15
5

15
25

YES
OPT

NO
NO

15

15
25
6
12
12

OPT
OPT
OPT

NO
NO
NO

2
2

4
10
6
6
10
4
4

OPT
YES
OPT
YES
YES
OPT
OPT

OPT
NO
NO
NO
NO
OPT
OPT

2
2
2
2

6
6
6
12

YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO

2
2
2

6
4
6

OPT
OPT
OPT

OPT
OPT
OPT

2
OPT

10
10

YES
YES

NO
NO

2
5
5
2
OPT
2
2
2

P = Positive N = Negative ± = Continuous directional control not required* OPT = Optional
t The term trauma room as used here is the first aid room/and or emergency room used for general
initial treatment of accident victims. The operating room within a trauma center that is routinely
used for emergency surgery should be treated as a operating room.
The isolation rooms described in these standards are those that might be used for infectious
patients in the average community hospital. The rooms are either positively or negatively
pressurized depending on the patient...
* Although continuous directional control is not required, variations should be minimized and in
no case should a lack of directional control allow the spread of infection from one area to another.
Boundaries between functional areas should have directional control.

Source: American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning
Engineers. 1991. 1991 ASHRAE Handbook. Atlanta.
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The CDC recognizes the recommendations for the minimum number of air
changes per hospital area by the American Society of Heating and Refrigeration
and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) shown in Table 7. The emergency
department, including its waiting area, is recognized as being one of the highest
contaminated areas of the hospital. This results from the contaminated condition
of many patients and the high traffic volume (28). The classification of trauma
rooms is deemed similar in nature to the emergency treatment area of a hospital
requiring a minimum of twelve air changes per hour. ASHRAE recommends
a minimum of ten air changes per hour be provided hourly for the waiting room
and the area to be negatively pressured to prevent the contamination of other
hospital areas.

7.2.2 Air Mixing
Another component of ventilation relates to the air mixing which must occur in
the ventilated room. Air mixing refers to the movement of air currents within
the room which prevent foul, stagnant air from collecting in poorly circulated
spaces within a room. The most ideal air supply is overhead with the exhaust
at the floor level. This method allows the freshest air to be provided in the
breathing or working zone and the contaminants to be pulled downward.
Some experts believe that the movement of air within some isolation rooms
should be laminar and not turbulent flow (29). The flow in most hospital and
industrial settings is turbulent with the exception of operating rooms and ultra-
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clean rooms utilized in some types of demanding manufacturing.

A

dimensionless quantity called the Reynolds number is derived by equation 7.5
and utilized to determine the type of flow characteristic.

Re = Reynolds Number, D = Duct Diameter (feet)
e = Fluid Density (lb/ft3), µ = Fluid Viscosity (pound seconds per square feet)
Once this value is calculated, the flow type is determined by the following
criteria:
Re < 2100 Laminar flow
2100 < Re < 4000 Transition flow
Re > 4000 Turbulent flow
The transition flow refers to a region where the flow may be laminar at times
while periodically returning to a turbulent type of flow.

7.2.3 Flow Direction
The direction of flow refers to the movement of air from rooms or areas
occupied by patients in adjacent areas. Isolation rooms which are used by TB
patients are typically designed to protect the hospital air supply. To achieve this
goal, a negative pressure is induced in the patient's room which would cause the
air to flow from adjacent areas into the room. This effect is created by
supplying less air into the room via the ventilation system and exhausting a
greater volume thereby creating a negative pressure by drawing air from outside
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sources such as corridors or alcove rooms.
However, simply drawing air from a corridor into an isolation room may be
introducing unwanted contaminants into the isolation room. TB patients are
often infected with HIV and potentially contaminated air drawn from a common
corridor may expose the patient with immunodeficiency to other potentially
lethal infectious bacteria. Most modern isolation room designs have a specially
ventilated ante-room or alcove at the room exit to the corridor. This room is
usually ventilated with opposite pressurization from the isolation room. Larger
urban teaching hospitals often have special isolation wards established with
elaborate ventilation systems which may allow the adjustment of the
pressurization of the isolation room, the ante room and the corridor depending
on the type of isolation desired.
Proper ventilation is difficult to maintain and must be closely monitored.
The opening of doors and windows or changes in temperature can drastically
effect the pressure differentials. Modern control systems utilizing automatic
digital technology and continuous closed loop system monitoring requiring no
human intervention are the ideal.

7.3 Filtering and Irradiation
Air exhausted from a TB isolation room must be vented directly to the outside
and not be recirculated. Filtering may be provided for exhaust air to limit the
outside concentrations of contaminated air from being too great if required by
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local regulations. The outside vent should never be located near other patient
areas, air intakes, animals or plants.
Areas like the emergency department or X-ray department may sometimes
be occupied by TB infected personnel. A percentage of the exhaust from these
areas is usually recirculated into the hospital ventilation system and not
completely exhausted. A filter or irradiation device may be placed in the
exhaust vents from these areas to insure that infectious material is not
recirculated through the return air system into other hospital areas. The use of
high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are approved for such a use.

7.3.1 High Efficiency Particulate Air Filters
HEPA filters have been demonstrated to filter particulate matter greater than
0.3 microns in diameter with 99.97% completion (28). Although no specific
data exists regarding the efficiency of HEPA filters in removing tuberculosis
bacilli, studies have proven these filters to be effective at removing aspergillus
spores which have the same diameter as TB (30).
HEPA filters are constructed of pleated paper or other filter material,
bonded to a housing or frame. The intent of this filter is to trap the smallest
of micro-particles; thus the smallest puncture or slightest separation between the
filter material and frame reduces the efficiency of the filtering effect
significantly. Proper manufacture, installation and testing are each essential to
achieve the desired effect of the system. Installation should only be performed
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Figure 5 Pressure drop tests for HEPA filter operation.
Source: McDermott, Henry J. 1977. Handbook of Ventilation for Contaminant
Control. Ann Arbor, Michigan. Ann Arbor Press. p.245.
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by qualified personnel familiar with the use of these specialized filters.
As HEPA filters trap nearly every particle over 0.3 microns in diameter, they
become clogged quickly by average room dusts or other microscopic
contaminants. Some installations may require the use of a non HEPA type
prefilter to prevent the HEPA filter from being clogged with larger particles.
Clogged or dirty filters may be easily detected by measuring the pressure
differentials across the filter. ASHRAE recommends the installation of
manometers across filtering banks so as to provide a quantitative method to
determine the need to change filters when dirty, as opposed to direct
visualization. As shown in Figure 5, a minimal drop in pressure occurs across
a clean filter, with a higher differential across a dirty filter. Sudden changes in
pressure may indicate the presence of a damaged or leaking filter. A
maintenance program designed for the particular use should be prepared by the
manufacturer and installer. It should detail the frequency of filter changes and
testing.
The ventilation system should be designed to allow the changing of HEPA
filters without introducing contaminants into the system. Contaminated filters
should be disposed of in accordance with local codes and legislation regarding
regulated medical waste. ASHRAE further recommends that the high
replacement costs for HEPA filters should not be overlooked in operating
budgets. Means Open Shop Building Construction estimates the cost of HEPA
filters to be eight times more than expensive than standard paper type filters.
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7.3.2 Germicidal UV Radiation
The use of UV lamps having a wave length of 100 to 290 nm for destroying TB
bacilli has met with some success and also controversy. As Koch demonstrated
soon after his isolation of the mycobacteria bacillus in 1882, sun light was shown
to destroy TB bacteria. The use of these lamps provided an artificial method to
reproduce this effect at a more concentrated level. In the early 1960's, Richard
Riley of Johns Hopkins University, showed by a controlled experiment that UV
lamps placed in ventilation ducts from rooms occupied by TB patients to cages
occupied by guinea pigs had a lower incidence of contracting TB (31). Although
no strong human data exists, and the same results have not been repeated, this
technique has been utilized for decades but not without controversy.
The use of UV lamps in patient rooms has been controversial because of
safety concerns. Short term adverse health effects with UV lamps is caused by
the direct exposure of humans to the damaging wavelengths with short term
exposure causing erythema of the skin and keratoconjunctivitis. Long term
exposure effects include basal cell carcinoma and cataracts. These effects are
only realized if the lamp is installed in the patient's room.
A wall or ceiling mounted unit may be placed in the patient's room in order
to disinfect the room air. These lamps are typically mounted high near the
ceiling to have the greatest effect in the breathing zone. The effectiveness of
these lamps is also influenced by the movement of air within the room. The
lamps must be left on day and night in order to achieve the desired effect.
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When the lamps are placed directly in the ventilation ducts, the exposure to
humans is eliminated. The UV light utilized in this area may be of higher
intensity as there is no human exposure except during required maintenance at
which time the lamp may be shut off. Warning signs should be placed on duct
access doors to warn maintenance worker of the presence and dangers of UV
light exposure. Obviously, lamps placed in the exhaust ducts will not protect the
persons occupying the same area as the TB patient and only disinfect the
exhaust air.
The UV lamps should be routinely cleaned of dusts and tested as to their
efficiency in the appropriate wave lengths. Bulbs should be replaced at the end
of their recommended life. The CDC recommends that a timing device be
installed as to indicate the end of the bulb life at a remote monitoring station.

7.4 The TB Isolation Room
The cornerstone of TB transmission prevention in a hospital setting is the AFB
isolation room. Reserved for those with active infectious TB, these rooms are
specially ventilated as previously described to achieve isolation by ventilation.
Suspected or confirmed cases of infectious TB should be admitted and moved
to these areas at the earliest possible moment. Patients should be fitted with
approved valveless masks until the transfer to these areas is completed.
Rooms must be single occupancy with private bath facilities and shower if
available. At teaching hospitals, the rooms should be large enough to
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accommodate a variety of medical equipment including a ventilator, and be able
to hold five to seven students without anyone touching the bed. A separate
wash basin may be provided in the ante-room or near the door for the health
care workers to utilize upon entering and exiting the room. As uncomplicated
cases of TB may remain infectious for two to three weeks, a window, TV and
phone may help to alleviate the sense of confinement. Electrical service of 120
and 208 volts should be provided in a convenient location for medical
equipment. Medical grade oxygen, compressed air, and suction should also be
provided at bedside.
Windows should be sealed and locked shut, doors must be fitted with
automatic closure devices to insure that they remain closed thereby preventing
changes in room pressurization. When used for AFB isolation, negative
pressurization is required; however, more versatile isolation rooms will permit
the pressurization to be changed between negative and positive dependent of the
patient's isolation requirement.
ASHRAE recommends that six air changes per hour including two fresh
outside air changes must be provided in isolation rooms. A monitoring station
should be set up to alarm the staff if any fluctuations in pressurization or flow
rate occur. A fail safe system which automatically activates backup power
sources should a power failure occur should be included in the design. One
such system would provide full exhaust on system failure with no make up
ventilation supplied. Supply air ducts should also be fitted with HEPA filters
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to prevent reverse migration during system failure and to filter the supply air
provided to the room. HEPA filtration would also be required when the room
is positively pressurized and used for non AFB isolation but for
immunosuppressant patients. Flutter strips placed near vents and frequent
testing with smoke tubes or smoke sticks are non mechanical methods to insure
the desired flow direction.
The AFB isolation rooms will often be located in separate isolation wards in
larger teaching hospitals or clustered in the medical-surgical floor of smaller
hospitals. The isolation rooms should be adequately identified by appropriate
signs. The nursing station serving these rooms should be ideally located within
view of the room to prevent unauthorized entry or exit from the area.
Once the patient's symptoms have subsided and he or she is improving
clinically, the patient may be moved to a private room. This usually occurs after
three weeks of effective treatment. When the patient's sputum is free of bacilli
for three consecutive days, he or she may be placed in a semi-private room with
others (32). The housekeeping staff may clean the isolation rooms in the same
manner as other hospital areas, but should wear PRs when in a AFB isolation
room whenever the patient is present.

7.4.1 Retrofit of Existing Facilities
Hospitals located in smaller communities may not have any specially designed
isolation rooms, and if so, they are usually very few in number. Existing patient
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rooms or wards may have to be converted into isolation areas because of the
increased demand, or to conform with state or local regulations. The greatest
difficulty in converting these areas is installing the necessary ventilation.
Existing exhaust vents must be sealed if they return to the general air supply of
the hospital. Walls, cracks, windows, floors and doors should also be sealed to
prevent unwanted infiltration.
A new ventilation system may have to be installed which is solely dedicated
to the space. Exhaust vents should also be located near the floor with the
supply near the ceiling to provide desired air mixing. UV lamps installed in the
rooms may be utilized as a secondary measure but should not replace the use
of negative pressurization to prevent migration of airborne bacilli to other
hospital areas. The use of alcoves or ante-rooms may permit pressurization to
be maintained for difficult retrofits. All systems installed should also be
equipped with fail safe monitoring systems similar to those used in new
construction.

7.5 Special Areas
The CDC also recognizes the importance of maintaining proper engineering
controls in other health care areas.

Hospices, nursing homes, correctional

facilities, ambulatory care facilities, emergency medical services and home health
services should all adhere to the TB transmission precautions outlined above.
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Ambulatory care facilities which care for both patients who may suffer from
TB and HIV must use special caution when caring for these individuals.
Patients should be firmly instructed to cover their mouths when coughing in
common areas like waiting rooms in such clinics. Ventilation systems should be
enhanced to provide frequent air changes and filtration by HEPA filters or
irradiation with UV lighting. When special high hazard procedures are
performed, they should be completed in isolation booths similar to those used
at inpatient facilities.

The medical staff should be familiar with the

administrative procedures and the use of PPE in hospitals.
Emergency medical services must also be concerned with transporting active
TB patients. Often EMS will be the first to contact a patient who may have
active TB. Recognition of the signs and symptoms of TB by the pre-hospital
care providers is essential towards utilizing the proper prevention measures to
be taken during transport and arrival at the ED. Ambulance personnel should
wear HEPA PR's when transporting suspected cases of active TB. Rear
windows of the ambulance should be opened if possible; the air conditioning or
heating unit should not be on a recycle setting and the rear exhaust vent should
be switched on. EMS personnel, when giving reports to the medical staff at the
receiving facility, should express their concern as to any suspicion of infectious
TB.
Home health care workers should also be familiar with the hazards
associated with TB. HEPA PR's should be worn whenever caring for patients
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with active infectious TB. If children or immuno-compromised persons live in
the same household, measures to relocate these individuals should be
considered. In reality, the home is an excellent setting to receive therapy as
exposure to others is limited. With proper patient and family education, the
quantity of airborne bacilli may be reduced by simply covering one's mouth with
a tissue when coughing. As family members are screened for TB during the
initial investigation, the home care worker should also monitor such individuals
for any the signs and symptom within the family.
Nursing homes and correctional facilities both contain populations which are
high risk groups or have immunosuppressant illnesses. The medical departments
at correctional facilities should adhere to the guidelines established for inpatient
facilities regarding administrative controls, PPE and engineering controls. The
primary concern regarding nursing homes relates to increased surveillance. New
residents and employees should be tested upon admission or employment at
these facilities. The CDC recommends that two Mantoux skin tests should be
performed for a more reliable baseline result as the percentage of false negative
results is high. Outbreaks should be reported to the local boards of health and
identified early to stem epidemic levels which may occur swiftly in these
confined residential settings. Local boards of health should investigate all TB
exposure contacts where outbreaks occur as described in the CDC document
Prevention and Control of Tuberculosis in Facilities Providing Long Term Care to
The Elderly.
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7.6 Summary
Engineering controls serve as the best method to prevent the transmission of
TB. These controls act passively and provide protection for employees and
other patients alike. The microbial concentration of TB in the air is reduced
thus decreasing the likelihood for exposure and preventing nosocomial
transmission. When installed during new construction, as opposed to retrofitting
old facilities, the higher costs of these special systems are significantly reduced.
However, the need for improved ventilation within common areas and the
construction of isolation rooms may only be realized as the TB epidemic grows.
Other engineering methods may be developed as a result of research currently
being conducted to help decrease the spread of TB among health care workers
in the near future.

CHAPTER 8

FUTURE TRENDS

8.1 Introduction
The CDC has recognized that discontinuities exist in our current understanding
of TB transmission in the workplace. The document entitled: Guidelines for
Preventing the Transmission of Tuberculosis in Health-care Settings, With a Special
Focus on HIV - Related Issues prepared by the CDC cited the need for research
in the following three areas:
1. Better quantifying the risk of tuberculosis transmission in a
variety of health care settings.
2. Assessing the acceptability, efficacy, adverse impact, and cost
effectiveness of currently available methods for preventing
transmission.
3. Developing better methods for preventing transmission. (8)
To increase knowledge in the three areas cited above, research in two separately
distinct fields needs to be conducted. The medical community must further
strive to explore the causes of the new resistant strains and search for a method
to rapidly identify and treat these TB strains. The occupational safety and
health community must analyze the value of the present transmission prevention
techniques and research new methods.

Published material from the

occupational health community is minimal; however, the medical community has
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made some advances in identifying drug resistant strains of TB.

8.2 Medical Research
The use of multiple antibiotics to treat TB has again become commonplace in
the past decade. The combinations of these medications were often selected by
the physician from past experience of success from the eleven available
tuberculocidal medications. This "blind" selection was necessitated because the
cultural examination required to identify the particular drug resistance of any
given TB strain takes several weeks or months, primarily because of the slow
growth of the bacilli in producing enough culture to test susceptibility. New
techniques are urgently needed to identify MRTB.
One new technique developed at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine
and the University of Pittsburgh (33) has shown promise in pinpointing drug
resistance quickly. The introduction of firefly luciferace into the Mycobacterium
tuberculosis by means of a bacterial virus called a "phage", allows the drug
sensitivity of tuberculocidal antibiotics to be measured. The luciferace will
literally "glow" when combined with luciferin and adenosine triphosphate (ATP)
as an energy source. ATP is found abundantly in healthy organisms including
mycobacterium Tuberculosis at the cellular level and less abundantly in
unhealthy or dying cells. TB bacilli, which are dying as a result of being treated
with an effective antibiotic, will have less ATP available for energy consumption.
A device called a luminometer is used to measure the light emitted by various
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culture samples treated with an individual antibiotic. The degree of drug
susceptibility may then be determined. As William Jacobs, who is a member of
the research team stated "If the sample was drug sensitive, the lights were out;
and if it was resistant, the lights would go on" (34).
Genetic modifications are currently being made which would alter the
phages to require even fewer TB bacteria to measure drug susceptibility. The
first experiments required approximately 10,000 bacteria, which would require
culturing for several days from a typical sputum sample. The new genetically
engineered phage may only require 1,000 bacteria to conduct the test, thereby
allowing the use of the patient's sputum with no culturing. In this manner, the
traditional month long technique to culture TB and identify drug resistance may
be reduced to days or even hours.
Several advantages of this new technique are obvious. Drug resistance can
now be determined much sooner, which would decrease the length of
communicability of the patient as time would not be wasted on ineffective
treatment. The most effective combination of medications may be given to
reduce the emergence of additional resistant strains. Pharmaceutical companies
also see this technique as a potential time saver in the development of new
antibiotics to combat TB. Where four to six weeks were previously required to
identify potential new tuberculocidal antibiotics, this time would also be
reduced. The research group envisions a simplified test packaged in a manner
that would also allow its use in third world countries in order to end the
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epidemic overseas.
Other research conducted by the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in
conjunction with the Wallaceville Animal research Center in New Zealand (35)
have identified the gene which may be responsible for INH resistance. This
suspect gene manufactures the protein which INH targets causing its
effectiveness. When the gene is mutated, the effectiveness of INH was found
to decrease and the strain is resistant to INH.
This new understanding of the action mechanism for INH enables
development of other antibiotics for use against TB. The researchers suggest
that INH blocks the synthesis of mycolic acid, a fatty acid that is part of the cell
wall of all mycobacterium. When the gene which is responsible for the
production of proteins which synthesis mycolic acid is mutated, that strain of TB
is found to be resistant to INH. Although the exact mechanism of INH is still
unknown, these findings represent the beginning of an understanding by
developing new techniques to sidestep the cell's resistance, or new antibiotics
with similar actions.

8.3 Occupational Safety and Health Research
Published material regarding the transmission of TB in occupational settings
prior to 1990 is limited, prompting the CDC's call for more research in this
area. Recent studies have been published regarding outbreaks of MRTB in
HIV hospital ward settings; however, more information must be gathered in
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other clinical settings with regard to the risk of exposure and the benefits of
current control methods as well as development of new control measures.

8.3.1 Administrative Controls
The best method available to prevent occupational exposure to TB is the early
identification of latent TB, and providing appropriate treatments before the
illness becomes communicable via the airborne route. The once mandatory
testing of all school children conducted in the 1960's and 70's has been
discontinued as a matter of policy, budget cuts and the false sense of security
that the illness has been eliminated. Policy makers should consider the
advantages of reinstituting or more strictly enforcing the screening of school
children in geographic regions where TB is prevalent. Local boards of health
must again investigate all family contacts of children who test positive to TB.
Prophylactic or preventative treatment should be given to all those in need.
Several papers have been published regarding the outbreaks of TB in special
health care settings. With the greatest number of outbreaks occurring in HIV
wards or clinics, these areas drew the greatest attention. The CDC studied
more than 200 cases in an attempt to identify the causative factors. Occurring
frequently between patients who shared semiprivate rooms and between
healthcare workers before TB is diagnosed, these exposures may be preventable
if AFB testing of sputum is accomplished soon after admission. PPD
conversions were also found to be high among those health care workers who

89
cared for known TB patients as compared to workers employed in areas without
TB patients. In several cases, the appropriate exposure control systems were
either not implemented or found to be inadequate. In one clinic, rooms where
aerosolized medication was administered were found to be positively
pressurized, thereby blowing the aerosolized TB bacilli throughout the clinic
exposing other patients and employees alike.
Typically, only areas where TB patients received inpatient care or outpatient
clinics were subject to studies. Control groups utilized in these studies often
consisted of staff from the surgical wards or operating rooms where no
anticipated contact with TB patients is expected. A more encompassing study
that would include all those employees who have contact with infectious TB
patients would be more beneficial towards completing the CDC request of:
"better quantitating the risk of tuberculosis transmission in a variety of health
care settings". Members of the emergency medical service, emergency
department, home health care, X-ray technicians, laboratory service and
housekeeping staff should be included in such a study. PPD conversions and
possible patient contacts identified should ascertain the possible cause of the
unprotected exposure.

8.3.2 Engineering Controls
The placement of a TB patient in an AFB isolation room may give a false sense
of security to the staff. The concepts of flow direction and air changes per hour
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are based on sound scientific data. Reducing of the concentrations of airborne
aerosols by dilution and providing negative pressurization clearly help to control
the path of the contaminant and reduce individual exposure risks. However,
proper maintenance of such systems is essential, as a false sense of security may
exist if the system fails. The cost of these ventilation systems is high and must
be justified. The CDC has recommended the assessment "of the acceptability,
efficacy, adverse impact and cost effectiveness" of such systems. Could these
expensive systems be replaced safely by some other method or combination of
methods? Will the use of HEPA filtration and UV light reduce the operating
costs of hospitals and provide the same level of protection to the employee?
Definitive answers to these questions are yet to be determined.
The often cited publication regarding the use of UV irradiation dates back
30 years to a experiment conducted at Johns Hopkins University School of
Hygiene and Public Health (31).

Originally designed to quantify the

infectiousness of air from a TB ward, the effectiveness of UV light against the
bacilli was documented. The results indicated that no infections occurred in the
control group of guinea pigs whose air supply passed through UV light; whereas
the untreated ward air group had a statistically significant number which
acquired TB. The tuberculocidal effects of UV light has been shown by other
researchers in other laboratory settings; however, information regarding the
equipment's use in actual clinical situations is limited. Hazards do exist when
using these lights in patient rooms as previously discussed.

Clinical
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experimentation to determine the most effective method of using UV in patients
rooms should be conducted. In this manner, health care workers may receive
the maximum benefit of such technology while caring for patients.
The use of HEPA filtration in TB settings is based on theoretical data, not
clinical testing with TB. These filters have been typically installed in ventilation
systems where exhausted room air is filtered before being returned to the
hospital reservoir air supply. A study which indicated that entire wall HEPA
filtration units with horizontal laminar flow were effective in reducing outbreaks
of nosocomial aspergillus infections in bone marrow transplant patients, justified
the use of HEPA for TB by the CDC (30). Aspergillus is a systemic fungal
disease which infects the lung. The aspergillus is two to seven microns in
diameter and is found in grains, leaves, grasses, soil, construction and building
materials. Following the installation of these elaborate filtration systems the
aspergillus infections in bone marrow transplants were eliminated. The CDC
believes that because of the similar physical size of the two microbes, and the
effectiveness of HEPA for combatting aspergillus, a direct correlation may be
assumed for TB.
But several questions remain unanswered as to its effectiveness in filtering
TB. The research was unclear if the laminar flow reduced the infectiousness of
the aspergillus. The CDC did not determine if any differences might exist
between H EPA's effectiveness at trapping a fungus as opposed to a bacteria.
A definitive answer to the use of HEPA filtration in ventilation systems will only
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be known after clinical testing with actual Mycobacteria tuberculosis.

8.3.3 Personal Protection Equipment
Another area which needs particular clarification is the selection of the personal
respirator. Several agencies have different opinions as to the type of PR should
be utilized. NIOSH recommends the use of air purifying respirators as the
minimum level of protection against TB as the bacteria is a biological hazard
and any exposure is considered hazardous. The CDC is vague as to the
specificate type of PR to be utilized, stating only that it should be capable of
filtering particles 1 to 5 microns in diameter. OSHA, which is responsible for
the enforcement of the workplace hazards, has selected HEPA PR's as the
acceptable standard. As with HEPA filtration, no clinical evidence regarding
the use of HEPA personal respirators has been shown. With the HEPA PR
sometimes serving as the only protection between the health care worker and
the Mycobacteria tuberculosis, the importance of determining its effectiveness
is essential.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Conclusions and Recommendations
In 1989 the CDC published their Strategic Plan for the Elimination of
Tuberculosis in the United States after recognizing the resurgence of the illness
in the general population. The CDC's publication set as a goal the elimination
of TB by the year 2010 in the United States based on the following three point
plan:
1. More effective use of existing prevention and control methods,
especially in high risk populations.
2. The development and evaluation of new technologies for
treatment, diagnosis and prevention.
3. The rapid assessment and transfer of newly developed
technologies into clinical and public health practice. (7)
Once this plan is completed successfully, occupational exposure to TB would
no longer be an issue. However, in the interim, occupational exposures will
continue to occur and efforts must be made to analyze the risk and reduce its
occurrence.
An increasing number of outbreaks of TB is occurring within the general
population; similarly, the number of nosocomial TB infections among health
care workers is also increasing. Health care facilities and regulatory agencies
reanalyzed the adequacy of current regulations and existing infrastructures. At
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many sites, the analysis indicated that prevention measures were often nonexistent or minimal at best. In some circumstances, infections may have actually
occurred as a result of faulty ventilation which distributed infectious aerosols
throughout the facility.
In December 1990, the CDC published the Guidelines for Preventing the
Transmission of Tuberculosis in Health Care Settings, With a Special Focus on HIV
Related Issues as a response to these outbreaks. The recommendations of this
document have been frequently cited within this thesis as they serve as the
groundwork for preventing occupational exposure to TB. These guidelines were
based on the best technology available at the time of publication, and called for
additional research to be conducted. Three years have passed since the
introduction of this document and only studies which investigated outbreaks
among health care workers who care for TB patients continuously have been
published. Details regarding the effectiveness and cost efficiency of these
existing engineering methods and PPE measures have not been examined nor
have new techniques been extensively researched.
The following items are suggested by the author as recommendations
concerning specific research needs and administrative measures which may
enhance our understanding and control of TB exposure in the work place:
1. Epidemiological studies which concentrate on all health care
employees who have contact with patients before and after
placement on AFB isolation should be conducted.
A cohort study which identifies patients with a diagnosis of TB during a stay at
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a health care facility would provide the basis for the study. Employees with
prolonged and casual contact with TB patients would be identified, when
possible, and monitored for TB infection. Information gathered may include the
initial admitting diagnosis of the patient, time when AFB isolation began if at
all, length of stay, clinical signs of communicability, types of infection control
measures employed, areas where unrecognized unprotected exposures occurred,
lab and autopsy results. Information regarding those employees who were

subjected to unprotected exposures should be closely scrutinized as to length of
exposure and potential communicability of the illness.

Information of this

nature may be obtained from patients' charts in most cases. Statistical analyses
should be employed to determine if any correlation exists between these criteria
for a variety of employee locations.
2. Testing the effectiveness of HEPA filtration and UV irradiation
in ventilation systems for the use in Mycobacteria tuberculosis
should be conducted.
A test may be utilized similar in design to Riley's in 1960, where TB ward air

was drawn off into test chambers occupied by guinea pigs. A TB ward where
the exhaust from several rooms is discharged through a single ventilation duct

would be the most ideal. A system of louvers and baffles may be employed to
allow the exhaust air to be segregated into test chambers with variable
combinations of rooms to the entire ward to first enable the determination the
baseline infectiousness of TB room exhaust air. Ward air may be vectored into
three individual test chambers one with HEPA, UV light and untreated. Factors
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which may be analyzed include the variable intensities of UV light required to
efficiently destroy airborne bacilli in the duct work and the ultimate effectiveness
of HEPA and life of the filter. Varying degrees of human exposure may be
extrapolated by removing guinea pigs at predetermined intervals for pathological
examination.
3. A study which determines the effectiveness of UV lamps placed
in the patients room should be explored. Lamp placement, light
intensity and exposure limits are all factors which should be
considered.
The effectiveness of placing of UV lamps in patient rooms may be determined
by utilizing the test chambers as mentioned in the previous recommendation.
Once the baseline infectiousness of the exhaust from a TB ward is known, the
UV lamps may be placed in patient rooms to determine the effectiveness by
comparing the baseline infectiousness among the guinea pigs with the irradiated
room air. Care must be utilized as to the placement of the lamp to avoid the
irradiation of air in close proximity to the exhaust vent which would tend to
skew the data. The ideal placement of the lamps would allow the destruction
of bacilli in the rooms breathing zone as to protect those who occupy the same
room as the patient. The safest and most effective intensities must also be
determined.
4. Standard testing protocols for personal respirators should be
developed to determine the optimal type to be utilized for TB
protection.
Tests which determine the effectiveness of PR's for use with TB need to be
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developed. PR's currently being utilized for TB are based on theoretical data
related to filtration effectiveness in industrial settings determined in a loaded
condition. This loaded condition will tend to increase the filtration effect
possibly giving a false sense of security when new. PR's utilized in the hospital
environment are often new or clean and the need to determine the filtration
effect at this level is necessary. Once this testing criteria is established the
effectiveness of various PR's may be determined including the HEPA for use
with TB. Perhaps this standard testing protocol will end the confusion which
currently exists among the health care community as to the proper PR to utilize.
5. Development of stand alone filtration technologies for use in
patient rooms may provide a temporary alternative to permanent
exhaust systems.
Technology of this nature may reduce the concentration of airborne
contaminants in patient rooms by circulating air through HEPA filters or across
high intensity UV lamps by means of a fan. The device may be utilized where
temporary air filtering measures may be required in the emergency department,
X-ray department or also where appropriate ventilation systems are not
available in patient rooms. Smaller portable filtering units may be developed
for use in ambulances which transport infectious persons. Portable filtering
units are currently available for laboratory use where harmful fumes are vented
across the appropriate filter. Advantages to this device would include a
decrease of the concentration in the patient rooms, limited expense and
portability. Only after clinical testing would devices of this nature be utilized
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as a substitute or interim measure when utilized for TB areas.
6. OSHA should develop regulations to enforce tuberculosis control
measures similar to those developed for bloodborne
pathogens.
The current enforcement policies in the area of TB exposure are tenuous at
best. Utilizing regulations and standards which are primarily related to
industrial settings, the correlation to healthcare use is at times distant.
Although several outbreaks of TB have occurred among health care workers and
been investigated, OSHA has yet to levy any fines. With regulations specifically
designed to protect the health care worker, enforcement may be more readily
executed. Many questions still remain unanswered as to the effectiveness of the
current technology and only after examination of the actual data resulting from
clinical research may the regulations be developed. Areas which should be
regulated by code include the administrative policies, PPE and engineering
controls as previously discussed in this thesis.
7. The financial means to establish funding of these research projects
and the execution of the exposure control plans including the
capital improvements required must be developed.
The difficulty in providing the funding and implementing occupational safety
programs in health care is as difficult in the health care industry as in general
industry. The required isolation areas equipped with special ventilation systems
are expensive to design, construct and maintain. Although most hospitals
currently possess isolation areas, an increased volume of patients will require the
construction of additional units. The provision of respiratory protection
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equipment, PPD testing and medical surveillance are all expenses which must
be recouped. Such costs will typically be passed onto the patients occupying
these rooms through normal billing procedures. However, the great majority of
these patients often will not have health insurance as they belong to lower socioeconomic status, the expense then remains uncollected and is borne by the
hospital or other patients. Will the health care industry find alternative funding
for these programs and capital improvements? Should special centers be
established which receive federal funding to provide the proper facilities for TB
patients? The Federal government must once again show resolve in the
elimination of TB and provide the necessary financial backing within the
proposed health care reform act to adequately treat the afflicted patients and
protect the health care worker.
The cooperation of all those involved with the exposure control plan is
necessary to allow the desired effect to be achieved. The belief that some may
have nothing to fear from acquiring TB is a false assumption. MRTB is
particularly stubborn to cure and especially lethal for those who have a
depressed immunosuppressant system. If TB were as lethal as HIV, would this
complacency exist? Would questions still remain unanswered as to the actual
risk and effectiveness of current exposure control measures? A hard lesson was
learned when HIV infections began to spread among the general population.
We cannot permit the same complacency to allow TB again to spread as a result
of similar misunderstandings and lack of concern.

APPENDIX A
*******************************************************************
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration
*******************************************************************
Part Number

1910

Standard Number 1910.134
Title

Respiratory protection.

(a) Permissible practice.
(1) In the control of those occupational diseases caused by breathing air
contaminated with harmful dusts, fogs, fumes, mists, gases, smokes, sprays, or
vapors, the primary objective shall be to prevent atmospheric contamination.
This shall be accomplished as far as feasible by accepted engineering control
measures (for example, enclosure or confinement of the operation, general and
local ventilation, and substitution of less toxic materials). When effective
engineering controls are not feasible, or while they are being instituted,
appropriate respirators shall be used pursuant to the following requirements.
(2) Respirators shall be provided by the employer when such equipment is
necessary to protect the health of the employee. The employer shall provide the
respirators which are applicable and suitable for the purpose intended. The
employer shall be responsible for the establishment and maintenance of a
respiratory protective program which shall include the
requirements outlined in paragraph (b) of this section.
(3) The employee shall use the provided respiratory protection in accordance
with instructions and training received.
(b) Requirements for a minimal acceptable program.
(1) Written standard operating procedures governing the selection and use of
respirators shall be established.
(2) Respirators shall be selected on the basis of hazards to which the worker
is exposed.
(3) The user shall be instructed and trained in the proper use of respirators
and their limitations.
(4) [Reserved]
(5) Respirators shall be regularly cleaned and disinfected. Those used by more
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than one worker shall be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected after each use.
(6) Respirators shall be stored in a convenient, clean, and sanitary location.
(7) Respirators used routinely shall be inspected during cleaning. Worn or
deteriorated parts shall be replaced. Respirators for emergency use such as
self-contained devices shall be thoroughly inspected at least once a month and
after each use.
(8) Appropriate surveillance of work area conditions and degree of employee
exposure or stress shall be maintained.
(9) There shall be regular inspection and evaluation to determine the
continued effectiveness of the program.
(10) Persons should not be assigned to tasks requiring use of respirators unless
it has been determined that they are physically able to perform the work and
use the equipment. The local physician shall determine what health and physical
conditions are pertinent. The respirator user's medical status should be reviewed
periodically (for instance, annually).
(11) Approved or accepted respirators shall be used when they are available.
The respirator furnished shall provide adequate respiratory protection against
the particular hazard for which it is designed in accordance with standards
established by competent authorities. The U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau
of Mines, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture are recognized as such
authorities. Although respirators listed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
continue to be acceptable for protection against specified pesticides, the U.S.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, is the agency now responsible for
testing and
approving pesticide respirators.
(c) Selection of respirators. Proper selection of respirators shall be made
according to the guidance of American National Standard Practices for
Respiratory Protection Z88.2-1969.
(d) Air quality.
(1) Compressed air, compressed oxygen, liquid air, and liquid oxygen used for
respiration shall be of high purity. Oxygen shall meet the requirements of the
United States Pharmacopoeia for medical or breathing oxygen. Breathing air
shall meet at least the requirements of the specification for Grade D breathing
air as described in Compressed Gas
Association Commodity Specification G-7.1-1966. Compressed oxygen shall not
be used in supplied-air respirators or in open circuit self-contained breathing
apparatus that have previously used compressed air. Oxygen must never be used
with air line respirators.
(2) Breathing air may be supplied to respirators from cylinders or air
compressors.
(i) Cylinders shall be tested and maintained as prescribed in the Shipping
Container Specification Regulations of the Department of Transportation (49
CFR Part 178).
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(ii) The compressor for supplying air shall be equipped with necessary safety
and standby devices. A breathing air-type compressor shall be used.
Compressors shall be constructed and situated so as to avoid entry of
contaminated air into the system and suitable in-line air purifying sorbent beds
and filters installed to further assure breathing air quality. A receiver of
sufficient capacity to enable the respirator wearer to escape from a
contaminated atmosphere in event of compressor failure, and alarms to indicate
compressor failure and overheating shall be installed in the system. If an
oil-lubricated compressor is used, it shall
have a high-temperature or carbon monoxide alarm, or both. If only a
high-temperature alarm is used, the air from the compressor shall be frequently
tested for carbon monoxide to insure that it meets the specifications in
paragraph (d)(1) of this section.
(3) Air line couplings shall be incompatible with outlets for other gas systems
to prevent inadvertent servicing of air line respirators with nonrespirable gases
or oxygen.
(4) Breathing gas containers shall be marked in accordance with American
National Standard Method of Marking Portable Compressed Gas Containers to
Identify the Material Contained, Z48.1-1954; Federal Specification BB-A-1034a,
June 21, 1968, Air, Compressed for Breathing Purposes; or Interim Federal
Specification GG-B-00675b, April 27, 1965, Breathing Apparatus,
Self-Contained.
(e) Use of respirators.
(1) Standard procedures shall be developed for respirator use. These should
include all information and guidance necessary for their proper selection, use,
and care. Possible emergency and routine uses of respirators should be
anticipated and planned for.
(2) The correct respirator shall be specified for each job. The respirator type
is usually specified in the work procedures by a qualified individual supervising
the respiratory protective program. The individual issuing them shall be
adequately instructed to insure that the correct respirator is issued.
(3) Written procedures shall be prepared covering safe use of respirators in
dangerous atmospheres that might be encountered in normal operations or in
emergencies. Personnel shall be familiar with these procedures and the available
respirators.
(i) In areas where the wearer, with failure of the respirator, could be overcome
by a toxic or oxygen-deficient atmosphere, at least one additional man shall be
present. Communications (visual, voice, or signal line) shall be maintained
between both or all individuals present. Planning shall be such that one
individual will be unaffected by any
likely incident and have the proper rescue equipment to be able to assist the
other(s) in case of emergency.
(ii) When self-contained breathing apparatus or hose masks with blowers are
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used in atmospheres immediately dangerous to life or health, standby men must
be present with suitable rescue equipment.
(iii) Persons using air line respirators in atmospheres immediately hazardous
to life or health shall be equipped with safety harnesses and safety lines for
lifting or removing persons from hazardous atmospheres or other and equivalent
provisions for the rescue of persons from hazardous atmospheres shall be used.
A standby man or men with suitable
self-contained breathing apparatus shall be at the nearest fresh air base for
emergency rescue.
(4) Respiratory protection is no better than the respirator in use, even though
it is worn conscientiously. Frequent random inspections shall be conducted by
a qualified individual to assure that respirators are properly selected, used,
cleaned, and maintained.
(5) For safe use of any respirator, it is essential that the user be properly
instructed in its selection, use, and maintenance. Both supervisors and workers
shall be so instructed by competent persons. Training shall provide the men an
opportunity to handle the respirator,
have it fitted properly, test its face-piece-to-face seal, wear it in normal air for
a long familiarity period, and, finally, to wear it in a test atmosphere.
(i) Every respirator wearer shall receive fitting instructions including
demonstrations and practice in how the respirator should be worn, how to adjust
it, and how to determine if it fits properly. Respirators shall not be worn when
conditions prevent a good face seal. Such conditions may be a growth of beard,
sideburns, a skull cap that projects under the facepiece,
or temple pieces on glasses. Also, the absence of one or both dentures can
seriously affect the fit of a facepiece. The worker's diligence in observing these
factors shall be evaluated by periodic check. To assure proper protection, the
facepiece fit shall be checked by the wearer each time he puts on the respirator.
This may be done by following the manufacturer's facepiece fitting instructions.
(ii) Providing respiratory protection for individuals wearing corrective glasses
is a serious problem. A proper seal cannot be established if the temple bars of
eye glasses extend through the sealing edge of the full facepiece. As a temporary
measure, glasses with short temple bars or without temple bars may be taped to
the wearer's head. Wearing of contact lenses in contaminated atmospheres with
a respirator shall not be allowed. Systems have been developed for mounting
corrective lenses inside full facepieces. When a workman must wear corrective
lenses as part of the facepiece, the facepiece and lenses shall be fitted by
qualified individuals to provide good vision, comfort, and a gas-tight seal.
(iii) If corrective spectacles or goggles are required, they shall be worn so as
not to affect the fit of the facepiece. Proper selection of equipment will
minimize or avoid this problem.
(f) Maintenance and care of respirators.
(1) A program for maintenance and care of respirators shall be adjusted to the
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type of plant, working conditions, and hazards involved, and shall include the
following basic services:
(i) Inspection for defects (including a leak check),
(ii) Cleaning and disinfecting,
(iii) Repair,
(iv) Storage
Equipment shall be properly maintained to retain its original effectiveness.
(2) (i) All respirators shall be inspected routinely before and after each use.
A respirator that is not routinely used but is kept ready for emergency use shall
be inspected after each use and at least monthly to assure that it is in
satisfactory working condition.
(ii) Self-contained breathing apparatus shall be inspected monthly. Air and
oxygen cylinders shall be fully charged according to the manufacturer's
instructions. It shall be determined that the regulator and warning devices
function properly.
(iii) Respirator inspection shall include a check of the tightness of connections
and the condition of the facepiece, headbands, valves, connecting tube, and
canisters. Rubber or elastomer parts shall be inspected for pliability and signs
of deterioration. Stretching and
manipulating rubber or elastomer parts with a massaging action will keep them
pliable and flexible and prevent them from taking a set during storage.
(iv) A record shall be kept of inspection dates and findings for respirators
maintained for emergency use.
(3) Routinely used respirators shall be collected, cleaned, and disinfected as
frequently as necessary to insure that proper protection is provided for the
wearer. Respirators maintained for emergency use shall be cleaned and
disinfected after each use.
(4) Replacement or repairs shall be done only by experienced persons with
parts designed for the respirator. No attempt shall be made to replace
components or to make adjustment or repairs beyond the manufacturer's
recommendations. Reducing or admission valves or regulators shall be returned
to the manufacturer or to a trained technician for
adjustment or repair.
(5) (i) After inspection, cleaning, and necessary repair, respirators shall be
stored to protect against dust, sunlight, heat, extreme cold, excessive moisture,
or damaging chemicals. Respirators placed at stations and work areas for
emergency use should be quickly accessible at all times and should be stored in
compartments built for the purpose. The
compartments should be clearly marked. Routinely used respirators, such as dust
respirators, may be placed in plastic bags. Respirators should not be stored in
such places as lockers or tool boxes unless they are in carrying cases or cartons.
(ii) Respirators should be packed or stored so that the facepiece and
exhalation valve will rest in a normal position and function will not be impaired
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by the elastomer setting in an abnormal position.
(iii) Instructions for proper storage of emergency respirators, such as gas
masks and self-contained breathing apparatus, are found in "use and care"
instructions usually mounted inside the carrying case lid.
(g) Identification of gas mask canisters.
(1) The primary means of identifying a gas mask canister shall be by means of
properly worded labels. The secondary means of identifying a gas mask canister
shall be by a color code.
(2) All who issue or use gas masks falling within the scope of this section shall
see that all gas mask canisters purchased or used by them are properly labeled
and colored in accordance with these requirements before they are placed in
service and that the labels and colors are properly maintained at all times
thereafter until the canisters have completely served their purpose.
(3) On each canister shall appear in bold letters the following:
(i) (Name for atmospheric contaminant)

Canister for
or

Type N Gas Mask Canister
(ii) In addition, essentially the following wording shall appear beneath the
appropriate phrase on the canister label: "For respiratory protection in
percent by volume of
atmospheres containing not more than
." (Name of atmospheric contaminant)
(4) Canisters having a special high-efficiency filter for protection against radio
nuclide and other highly toxic particulate shall be labeled with a statement of
the type and degree of protection afforded by the filter. The label shall be
affixed to the neck end of, or to the gray
stripe which is around and near the top of, the canister. The degree of
protection shall be marked as the percent of penetration of the canister by a
0.3-micron-diameter dioctyl phthalate (DOP) smoke at a flow rate of 85 liters
per minute.
(5) Each canister shall have a label warning that gas masks should be used
only in atmospheres containing sufficient oxygen to support life (at least 16
percent by volume), since gas mask canisters are only designed to neutralize or
remove contaminants from the air.
(6) Each gas mask canister shall be painted a distinctive color or combination
of colors indicated in Table I-1. All colors used shall be such that they are
clearly identifiable by the user and clearly distinguishable from one another. The
color coating used shall offer a
high degree of resistance to chipping, scaling, peeling, blistering, fading, and the
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effects of the ordinary atmospheres to which they may be exposed under normal
conditions of storage and use. Appropriately colored pressure sensitive tape may
be used for the stripes.
TABLE I-1
Atmospheric contaminants
to be protected against
Acid gases
Hydrocyanic acid gas

Chlorine gas

Organic vapors
Ammonia gas
Acid gases and ammonia gases

Carbon Monoxide
Acid gases and organic vapors
Hydrocyanic acid gas and chloropicrin
vapor
Acid gases, organic vapors, and ammonia
gases
Radioactive materials, excepting
tritium and noble gases
Particulate (dusts, fumes, mists,
fogs, or smokes) in combination with
any of the above gases or vapors
All of the above atmospheric
contaminants

Colors assigned(1)

White.
White with 1/2-inch green stripe
completely around the canister
near the bottom.
White with 1/2-inch yellow stripe
completely around the canister
near the bottom.
Black.
Green.
Green with 1/2-inch white stripe
completely around the canister
near the bottom.
Blue.
Yellow.
Yellow with 1/2-inch blue stripe
completely around the canister
near the bottom.
Brown.
Purple (Magenta).
Canister color for contaminant,as
designated above, with 1/2-inch
gray stripe completely around the
canister near the top.
Red with 1/2-inch gray stripe
completely around the canister
near the top.

Footnote(1) Gray shall not be assigned as a main color for a canister designed
to remove acids or vapors.
NOTE: Orange shall be used as a complete body, or stripe color to represent
gases not included in this table. The user will need to refer to the canister label
to determine the degree of protection the canister will afford.
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(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number
1218-0099)
[39 FR 23502, June 27, 1974, as amended at 43 FR 49748, Oct. 24, 1978; 49 FR
5322, Feb. 10, 1984; 49 FR 18295, Apr. 30, 1984]
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Part Number

1915

Standard Number 1915.152
Title

Respiratory protection.

(a) General.
(1) All respiratory equipment required by this Part shall be approved for the
use for which it is intended by the Mine Safety and Health Administration and
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health pursuant to the
provisions of 30 CFR Part 11. Respiratory protective equipment shall be used
only for the purpose intended and no modifications of the equipment shall be
made.
(2) Respiratory protective equipment shall be inspected regulatory and
maintained in good condition. Gas mask canisters and chemical cartridges shall
be replaced as necessary so as to provide complete protection. Mechanical filters
shall be cleaned or replaced as necessary so as to avoid undue resistance to
breathing.
(3) Respiratory protective equipment which has been previously used shall be
cleaned and disinfected before it is issued by the employer to another employee.
Emergency rescue equipment shall be cleaned and disinfected immediately after
each use.
(4) Employees required to use respiratory protective equipment approved for
use in atmospheres immediately dangerous to life shall be thoroughly trained in
its use. Employees required to use other types of respiratory protective
equipment shall be instructed in the use and limitations of such equipment.
1915.152(a)(5)
(5) When an air line respirator is used, the air line shall be fitted with a
pressure regulating valve and a filter which will remove oil water and rust
particles. The air intake shall be from a source which is free from all
contaminants, such as the exhaust from internal combustion engines.
(6) In all cases when an employee is stationed outside a compartment, tank or
space as a tender or safety man for men working inside in an atmosphere
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immediately dangerous to life, the tender shall have immediately available for
emergency use respiratory protective equipment equivalent to that required for
the men in the compartment. When a tender is stationed outside a compartment
for men working inside in an atmosphere not immediately dangerous to life, the
tender shall wear respiratory protective equipment equivalent to that required
for the men in the compartment if he is exposed for prolonged periods to the
same concentration of atmospheric contaminants.
(b) Protection in atmospheres immediately dangerous to life.
(1) Atmospheres immediately dangerous to life are those which contain less
than 16.5 percent oxygen, or which by reason of the high toxicity of the
contaminant, as in fumigation, or high concentration of the contaminant, as with
carbon dioxide, would endanger the life of a person breathing them for even a
short period of time.
(2) In atmospheres immediately dangerous to life the only approved types of
respiratory protective equipment are the following:
(i) Self-contained breathing apparatus, in which the wearer carries with him
a supply of oxygen, air, or an oxygen generating material.
(ii) Hose mask with blower, in which a hand or motor operated blower
supplies air at high volume and low pressure through a large diameter hose
through which the wearer can draw air in case the blower fails.
(iii) If there is known to be more than 16 percent oxygen and less than 2
percent gas by volume, a gas mask equipped with a canister approved for the
particular type gas involved.
Note: A gas mask offers absolutely no protection in an atmosphere deficient
in oxygen.
(3) Work in atmospheres immediately dangerous to life shall be performed
only in an emergency, as when rescuing a man who has been overcome or when
shutting off a source of contamination that cannot otherwise be controlled.
When an employee enters such an atmosphere he shall be provided with and
use an adequate, attended life line.
(4) In the vicinity of each vessel in which there is a danger of employees being
exposed to an atmosphere immediately dangerous to life, the employer shall
have on hand and ready for use respiratory protective equipment approved for
such use. When such equipment is required, one or more persons shall be
thoroughly trained in the use of the equipment.
(c) Protection against gaseous contaminants not immediately dangerous to life.
(1) Gaseous contaminants not immediately dangerous to life are gases present
in concentrations that could be breathed for a short period without endangering
the life of a person breathing them, but which might produce discomfort and
possible injury after a prolonged single exposure or repeated short exposures.
(2) When employees are exposed to a gaseous contaminated atmosphere not
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immediately dangerous to life, they shall be protected by respiratory protective
equipment approved for use in the type and concentration of the gaseous
contaminant as follows:
(i) In high or unknown concentrations, a hose mask or an air line respirator.
The use of either a hose mask or an air line respirator in lower concentrations
is permissible.
(ii) In concentrations of ammonia of less than 3 percent, or of other gases less
than 2 percent, by volume, a canister type gas mask equipped with the proper
type of canister. Different canisters are approved for specific use against the
following gases or groups of gases: Acid gases, hydrocyanic acid gas, chlorine
gas, organic vapors, ammonia gas, carbon monoxide, or combination of the
above.
(iii) In low concentrations (less than 0.1 percent by volume), a chemical
cartridge respirator equipped with the type of cartridge approved for use against
the particular gases or groups of gases listed in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this
section.
(d) Protection against particulate contaminants not immediately dangerous to
life.
(1) When employees are exposed to unsafe concentrations of particular
contaminants, such as dusts and fumes, mists and fogs or combinations of solids
and liquids, they shall be protected by either air line or filter respirators, except
as otherwise provided in this part.
(2) Filter respirators shall be equipped with the proper type of filter. Different
filters are approved for specific protection against groups of contaminants, as
follows:
(i) Pneumoconiosis-producing dust and nuisance dust filters which provide
respiratory protection against pneumoconiosis-producing dusts,such as
aluminum, cellulose, cement, charcoal, coal, coke, flour, gypsum, iron ore,
limestone and wood.
(ii) Toxic dust filters which provide respiratory protection against toxic dusts
that are not significantly more toxic than lead, such as arsenic, cadmium,
chromium, lead, manganese, selenium, vanadium, and their compounds.
(iii) Mist filters which provide respiratory protection against
pneumoconiosis-producting mists, chromic acid mists, and nuisance mists.
(iv) Fume filters which provide respiratory protection against fumes (solid
dispersoids or particulate matter formed by the condensation of vapors, such as
those from heated metals and other substances).
(v) Filters which provide respiratory protection against combinations of two or
more of the contaminants described in paragraphs (d)(2) (i) through (iv) of this
section.
(e) Protection against combinations of gaseous and particulate contaminants
not immediately dangerous to life.
(1) When employees are exposed to combinations of gaseous and particulate
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contaminants not immediately dangerous to life, as in spray painting they shall
be protected by respiratory protective equipment approved for use in the type
and concentration of the contaminants, as follows:
(i) In high or unknown concentrations, a hose mask or an air line respirator.
The use of either a hose mask or an air line respirator is permissible in lower
concentrations.
(ii) In concentrations of gaseous contaminants of less than 2 percent by
volume, a canister type gas mask with a combination canister approved for the
particular type of gaseous contaminant as specified in paragraph (c)(2) of this
section and a filter for the particular type of particulate contaminant as specified
in paragraph (d)(1) of this section.
(iii) In low concentrations of gaseous contaminants (less than 0.1 percent by
volume) a respirator equipped with the type of cartridge and filter as specified
in paragraph (e)(ii) of this section.

APPENDIX C
*******************************************************************
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
*******************************************************************
Part Number

1910

Standard Number 1910.1030

Title Bloodborne pathogens.
* [Effective date for this standard, 1910.1030, is Mar. 6, 1992] Authority: Secs.
6 and 8, Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.655, 657, Secretary of
Labor's Orders Nos. 12-71 (36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41FR 25059), or 9-83 (48 FR
35736), as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911. Section 1910.1030 also issued
under 29 U.S.C. 653.
(a) Scope and Application. This section applies to all occupational exposure
to blood or other potentially infectious materials as defined by paragraph (b) of
this section.
(b) Definitions. For purposes of this section, the following shall
apply:"Assistant Secretary" means the Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, or designated representative.
"Blood" means human blood, human blood components, and products made
from human blood.
"Bloodborne Pathogens" means pathogenic microorganisms that are present in
human blood and can cause disease in humans. These pathogens include,but are
not limited to, hepatitis B virus (HBV) and humanimmunodeficiency virus
(HIV).
"Clinical Laboratory" means a workplace where diagnostic or other screening
procedures are performed on blood or other potentially infectious materials.
"Contaminated" means the presence or the reasonably anticipated presence of
blood or other potentially infectious materials on an item or surface.
"Contaminated Laundry" means laundry which has been soiled with blood or
other potentially infectious materials or may contain sharps.
"Contaminated Sharps" means any contaminated object that can penetrate the
skin including, but not limited to, needles, scalpels, broken glass,broken capillary
tubes, and exposed ends of dental wires.
"Decontamination" means the use of physical or chemical means to
remove,inactivate, or destroy bloodborne pathogens on a surface or item to the
point where they are no longer capable of transmitting infectious particles and
the surface or item is rendered safe for handling, use, or disposal.
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"Director" means the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, or designated
representative.
"Engineering Controls" means controls (e.g., sharps disposal
containers,self-sheathing needles) that isolate or remove the bloodborne
pathogens hazard from the workplace.
"Exposure Incident" means a specific eye, mouth, other mucous
membrane,non-intact skin, or parenteral contact with blood or other potentially
infectious materials that results from the performance of an employee'sduties.
"Handwashing Facilities" means a facility providing an adequate supply of
running potable water, soap and single use towels or hot air drying machines.
"Licensed Healthcare Professional" is a person whose legally permitted scope
of practice allows him or her to independently perform the activities required
by paragraph (f) Hepatitis B Vaccination and Post-exposure Evaluation and
Follow-up.
"HBV" means hepatitis B virus.
"HIV" means human immunodeficiency virus.
"Occupational Exposure" means reasonably anticipated skin, eye,
mucousmembrane, or parenteral contact with blood or other potentially
infectious materials that may result from the performance of an employee's
duties.
"Other Potentially Infectious Materials" means (1) The following human body
fluids: semen, vaginal secretions, cerebrospinal fluid, synovial fluid, pleural fluid,
pericardial fluid, peritoneal fluid, amniotic fluid, saliva in dental procedures,
any body fluid that is visibly contaminated with blood, and all body fluids in
situations where it is difficult or impossible to differentiate between body fluids;
(2) Anyun fixed tissue or organ (other than intact skin) from a human (living
or dead); and (3) HIV-containing cell or tissue cultures, organ cultures,and
HIV- or HBV-containing culture medium or other solutions; and blood,organs,
or other tissues from experimental animals infected with HIV or HBV.
"Parenteral" means piercing mucous membranes or the skin barrier through
such events as needle sticks, human bites, cuts, and abrasions.
"Personal Protective Equipment" is specialized clothing or equipment worn by
an employee for protection against a hazard. General work clothes(e.g.,
uniforms, pants, shirts or blouses) not intended to function as protection against
a hazard are not considered to be personal protective equipment.
"Production Facility" means a facility engaged in industrial-scale,large-volume
or high concentration production of HIV or HBV.
"Regulated Waste" means liquid or semi-liquid blood or other potentially
infectious materials; contaminated items that would release blood or other
potentially infectious materials in a liquid or semi-liquid state if compressed;
items that are caked with dried blood or other potentially infectious materials
and are capable of releasing these materials during handling; contaminated
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sharps; and pathological and microbiological wastes containing blood or other
potentially infectious materials.
"Research Laboratory" means a laboratory producing or using
research-laboratory-scale amounts of HIV or HBV. Research laboratories may
produce high concentrations of HIV or HBV but not in the volume found in
production facilities.
"Source Individual" means any individual, living or dead, whose blood or other
potentially infectious materials may be a source of occupational exposure to the
employee. Examples include, but are not limited to,hospital and clinic patients;
clients in institutions for the developmentally disabled; trauma victims; clients
of drug and alcohol treatment facilities; residents of hospices and nursing
homes; human remains; and individuals who donate or sell blood or blood
components.
"Sterilize" means the use of a physical or chemical procedure to destroy all
microbial life including highly resistant bacterial endospore.
"Universal Precautions" is an approach to infection control. According to the
concept of Universal Precautions, all human blood and certain human body
fluids are treated as if known to be infectious for HIV, HBV, and other
bloodborne pathogens.
"Work Practice Controls" means controls that reduce the likelihood of
exposure by altering the manner in which a task is performed (e.g.,prohibiting
recapping of needles by a two-handed technique).
(c) Exposure Control.
(1) Exposure Control Plan.
(i) Each employer having an employee(s) with occupational exposure as
defined by paragraph (b) of this section shall establish a written Exposure
Control Plan designed to eliminate or minimize employee exposure.
(ii) The Exposure Control Plan shall contain at least the following elements:
(A) The exposure determination required by paragraph (c)(2),
(B) The schedule and method of implementation for paragraphs (d)Methods
of Compliance, (e) HIV and HBV Research Laboratories and Production
Facilities, (f) Hepatitis B Vaccination and Post-Exposure Evaluation and
Follow-up, (g) Communication of Hazards to Employees, and(h) Record
keeping, of this standard, and (C) The procedure for the evaluation of
circumstances surrounding exposure incidents as required by paragraph (f)(3)(i)
of this standard.
(iii) Each employer shall ensure that a copy of the Exposure Control Plan is
accessible to employees in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.20(e).
(iv) The Exposure Control Plan shall be reviewed and updated at least
annually and whenever necessary to reflect new or modified tasks and
procedures which affect occupational exposure and to reflect new or revised
employee positions with occupational exposure.
(v) The Exposure Control Plan shall be made available to the Assistant
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Secretary and the Director upon request for examination and copying.
(2) Exposure Determination.
(i) Each employer who has an employee(s)with occupational exposure as
defined by paragraph
(b) of this section shall prepare an exposure determination. This exposure
determination shall contain the following:
(A) A list of all job classifications in which all employees in those job
classifications have occupational exposure;
(B) A list of job classifications in which some employees have occupational
exposure, and
(C) A list of all tasks and procedures or groups of closely
related task and procedures in which occupational exposure occurs and that are
performed by employees in job classifications listed in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (c)(2)(i)(B) of this standard.
(ii) This exposure determination shall be made without regard to the use of
personal protective equipment.
(d) Methods of Compliance.
(1) General. Universal precautions shall be observed to prevent contact with
blood or other potentially infectious materials. Under circumstances in which
differentiation between body fluid types is difficult or impossible, all body fluids
shall be considered potentially infectious materials.
(2) Engineering and Work Practice Controls.
(i) Engineering and work practice controls shall be used to eliminate or
minimize employee exposure. Where occupational exposure remains after
institution of these controls, personal protective equipment shall also be used.
(ii) Engineering controls shall be examined and maintained or replace don a
regular schedule to ensure their effectiveness.
(iii) Employers shall provide handwashing facilities which are readily accessible
to employees.
(iv) When provision of handwashing facilities is not feasible, the employer shall
provide either an appropriate antiseptic hand cleanser in conjunction with clean
cloth/paper towels or antiseptic towelettes. When antiseptic hand cleansers or
towelettes are used, hands shall be washed with soap and running water as soon
as feasible.
(v) Employers shall ensure that employees wash their hands immediately or as
soon as feasible after removal of gloves or other personal protective equipment.
(vi) Employers shall ensure that employees wash hands and any other skin with
soap and water, or flush mucous membranes with water immediately or as soon
as feasible following contact of such body areas with blood or other potentially
infectious materials.
(vii) Contaminated needles and other contaminated sharps shall not be bent,
recapped, or removed except as noted in paragraphs (d)(2)(vii)(A)and
(d)(2)(vii)(B) below. Shearing or breaking of contaminated needles is prohibited.
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(A) Contaminated needles and other contaminated sharps shall not be
recapped or removed unless the employer can demonstrate that no alternative
is feasible or that such action is required by a specific medical procedure.
(B) Such recapping or needle removal must be accomplished through the use
of a mechanical device or a one-handed technique.
(viii) Immediately or as soon as possible after use, contaminated reusable
sharps shall be placed in appropriate containers until properly reprocessed.
These containers shall be:
(A) puncture resistant;
(B) labeled or color-coded in accordance with this standard;
(C) leak proof on the sides and bottom; and
(D) in accordance with the requirements set forth in paragraph (d)(4)(ii)(E)
for reusable sharps.
(ix) Eating, drinking, smoking, applying cosmetics or lip balm, and handling
contact lenses are prohibited in work areas where there is a reasonable
likelihood of occupational exposure.
(x) Food and drink shall not be kept in refrigerators, freezers,shelves, cabinets
or on counter tops or bench tops where blood or other potentially infectious
materials are present. (xi) All procedures involving blood or other potentially
infectious materials shall be performed in such a manner as to minimize
splashing,spraying, spattering, and generation of droplets of these substances.
(xii) Mouth pipetting/suctioning of blood or other potentially infectious
materials is prohibited.
(xiii) Specimens of blood or other potentially infectious materials shall be
placed in a container which prevents leakage during collection,handling,
processing, storage, transport, or shipping.
(A) The container for storage, transport, or shipping shall be labeled or
color-coded according to paragraph (g)(1)(i) and closed prior to being stored,
transported, or shipped. When a facility utilizes Universal Precautions in the
handling of all specimens, the labeling/color-coding of specimens is not
necessary provided containers are recognizable as containing specimens. This
exemption only applies while such specimens/containers remain within the
facility. Labeling or color-coding in accordance with paragraph (g)(1)(i) is
required when such specimens/containers leave the facility.
(B) If outside contamination of the primary container occurs, the primary
container shall be placed within a second container which prevents leakage
during handling, processing, storage, transport, or shipping and is labeled or
color-coded according to the requirements of this standard.
(C) If the specimen could puncture the primary container, the primary
container shall be placed within a secondary container which is
puncture-resistant in addition to the above characteristics.
(xiv) Equipment which may become contaminated with blood or other
potentially infectious materials shall be examined prior to servicing or shipping
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and shall be decontaminated as necessary, unless the employer can demonstrate
that decontamination of such equipment or portions of such equipment is not
feasible.
(A) A readily observable label in accordance with paragraph(g)(1)(i)(H) shall
be attached to the equipment stating which portions remain contaminated.
(B) The employer shall ensure that this information is conveyed to all affected
employees, the servicing representative, and/or the manufacturer, as appropriate,
prior to handling, servicing, or shipping so that appropriate precautions will be
taken.
(3) Personal Protective Equipment.
(i) Provision. When there is occupational exposure, the employer shall provide,
at no cost to the employee, appropriate personal protective equipment such as,
but not limited to, gloves, gowns, laboratory coats, face shields or masks and eye
protection, and mouthpieces, resuscitation bags, pocket masks, or other
ventilation devices. Personal protective equipment will be considered
"appropriate" only if it does not permit blood or other potentially infectious
materials to pass through to or reach the employee's work clothes, street clothes,
undergarments, skin, eyes,mouth, or other mucous membranes under normal
conditions of use and for the duration of time which the protective equipment
will be used.
(ii) Use. The employer shall ensure that the employee uses appropriate
personal protective equipment unless the employer shows that the employee
temporarily and briefly declined to use personal protective equipment when,
under rare and extraordinary circumstances, it was the employee's professional
judgment that in the specific instance its use would have prevented the delivery
of health care or public safety services or would have posed an increased hazard
to the safety of the worker or co-worker.When the employee makes this
judgement, the circumstances shall be investigated and documented in order to
determine whether changes can be instituted to prevent such occurrences in the
future.
(iii) Accessibility. The employer shall ensure that appropriate personal
protective equipment in the appropriate sizes is readily accessible at the work
site or is issued to employees. Hypoallergenic gloves, glove liners, powderless
gloves, or other similar alternatives shall be readily accessible to those
employees who are allergic to the gloves normally provided.
(iv) Cleaning, Laundering, and Disposal. The employer shall clean,launder, and
dispose of personal protective equipment required by paragraphs (d) and (e) of
this standard, at no cost to the employee.
(v) Repair and Replacement. The employer shall repair or replace personal
protective equipment as needed to maintain its effectiveness, at no cost to the
employee.
(vi) If a garment(s) is penetrated by blood or other potentially infectious
materials, the garment(s) shall be removed immediately or as soon as feasible.
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(vii) All personal protective equipment shall be removed prior to leaving the
work area.
(viii) When personal protective equipment is removed it shall be
placed in an appropriately designated area or container for storage,
washing,decontamination or disposal.
(ix) Gloves. Gloves shall be worn when it can be reasonably anticipated that
the employee may have hand contact with blood, other potentially infectious
materials, mucous membranes, and non-intact skin; when performing vascular
access procedures except as specified in paragraph(d)(3)(ix)(D); and when
handling or touching contaminated items or surfaces.
(A) Disposable (single use) gloves such as surgical or examination gloves, shall
be replaced as soon as practical when contaminated or as soon as feasible if they
are torn, punctured, or when their ability to function as a barrier is
compromised.
(B) Disposable (single use) gloves shall not be washed or decontaminated for
re-use.
(C) Utility gloves may be decontaminated for re-use if the integrity of the
glove is not compromised. However, they must be discarded if they are cracked,
peeling, torn, punctured, or exhibit other signs of deterioration or when their
ability to function as a barrier is compromised.
(D) If an employer in a volunteer blood donation center judges that routine
gloving for all phlebotomies is not necessary then the employer shall:
{1} Periodically reevaluate this policy;
{2} Make gloves available to all employees who wish to use them for
phlebotomy;
{3} Not discourage the use of gloves for phlebotomy; and
{4} Require that gloves be used for phlebotomy in the following
circumstances:
{i} When the employee has cuts, scratches, or other breaks in his or her skin;
{ii} When the employee judges that hand contamination with blood may occur,
for example, when performing phlebotomy on an uncooperative source
individual; and
{iii} When the employee is receiving training in phlebotomy.
(x) Masks, Eye Protection, and Face Shields. Masks in combination with eye
protection devices, such as goggles or glasses with solid side shields, or
chin-length face shields, shall be worn whenever splashes,spray, spatter, or
droplets of blood or other potentially infectious materials may be generated and
eye, nose, or mouth contamination can be reasonably anticipated.
(xi) Gowns, Aprons, and Other Protective Body Clothing. Appropriate
protective clothing such as, but not limited to, gowns, aprons, lab coats, clinic
jackets, or similar outer garments shall be worn in occupational exposure
situations. The type and characteristics will depend upon the task and degree of
exposure anticipated.
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(xii) Surgical caps or hoods and/or shoe covers or boots shall be worn in
instances when gross contamination can reasonably be anticipated(e.g.,
autopsies, orthopaedic surgery).
(4) Housekeeping.
(i) General. Employers shall ensure that the work site is maintained in a clean
and sanitary condition. The employer shall determine and implement an
appropriate written schedule for cleaning and method of decontamination based
upon the location within the facility,type of surface to be cleaned, type of soil
present, and tasks or procedures being performed in the area.
(ii) All equipment and environmental and working surfaces shall be cleaned
and decontaminated after contact with blood or other potentially infectious
materials.
(A) Contaminated work surfaces shall be decontaminated with an appropriate
disinfectant after completion of procedures; immediately or as soon as feasible
when surfaces are overtly contaminated or after any spill of blood or other
potentially infectious materials; and at the end of the work shift if the surface
(B) Protective
may have become contaminated since the last cleaning.
coverings, such as plastic wrap, aluminum foil, or imperviously-backed absorbent
paper used to cover equipment and environmental surfaces, shall be removed
and replaced as soon as feasible when they become overtly contaminated or at
the end of the work shift if they may have become contaminated during the
shift.
(C) All bins, pails, cans, and similar receptacles intended for reuse which have
a reasonable likelihood for becoming contaminated with blood or other
potentially infectious materials shall be inspected and decontaminated on a
regularly scheduled basis and cleaned and decontaminated immediately or as
soon as feasible upon visible contamination.
(D) Broken glassware which may be contaminated shall not be picked up
directly with the hands. It shall be cleaned up using mechanical means,such as
a brush and dust pan, tongs, or forceps.
(E) Reusable sharps that are contaminated with blood or other potentially
infectious materials shall not be stored or processed in a manner that requires
employees to reach by hand into the containers where these sharps have been
placed.
(iii) Regulated Waste.
(A) Contaminated Sharps Discarding and Containment. {1} Contaminated
sharps shall be discarded immediately or as soon as feasible in containers that
are: [a] Closable; [b] Puncture resistant; [c] Leak proof on sides and bottom;
and [d] Labeled or color-coded in accordance with paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this
standard.
{2} During use, containers for contaminated sharps shall be: [a] Easily
accessible to personnel and located as close as is feasible to the immediate area
where sharps are used or can be reasonably anticipated to be found (e.g.,
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laundries); [b] Maintained upright throughout use; and [c] Replaced routinely
and not be allowed to overfill. {3} When moving containers of contaminated
sharps from the area of use,the containers shall be: [a] Closed immediately
prior to removal or replacement to prevent spillage or protrusion of contents
during handling, storage, transport,or shipping; [b] Placed in a secondary
container if leakage is possible. The second container shall be: [i] Closable;
[ii] Constructed to contain all contents and prevent leakage during handling,
storage, transport, or shipping; and [iii] Labeled or color-coded according to
paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this standard. {4} Reusable containers shall not be
opened, emptied, or cleaned manually or in any other manner which would
expose employees to the risk of percutaneous injury.
(B) Other Regulated Waste Containment. {1} Regulated waste shall be
placed in containers which are: [a] Closable; [b] Constructed to contain all
contents and prevent leakage of fluids during handling, storage, transport or
shipping; [c] Labeled or color-coded in accordance with paragraph (g)(1)(i)
this standard; and
[d] Closed prior to removal to prevent spillage or
protrusion of contents during handling, storage, transport, or shipping. {2} If
outside contamination of the regulated waste container occurs,it shall be placed
[b]
[a] Closable;
in a second container. The second container shall be:
Constructed to contain all contents and prevent leakage of fluids during
handling, storage, transport or shipping;
[c] Labeled or color-coded in
accordance with paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this standard; and [d] Closed prior to
removal to prevent spillage or protrusion of contents during handling, storage,
transport, or shipping.
(C) Disposal of all regulated waste shall be in accordance with applicable
regulations of the United States, States and Territories, and political
subdivisions of States and Territories.
(iv) Laundry.
(A) Contaminated laundry shall be handled as little as possible with a
minimum of agitation. {1} Contaminated laundry shall be bagged or
containerized at the location where it was used and shall not be sorted or rinsed
in the location of use. {2} Contaminated laundry shall be placed and
transported in bags or containers labeled or color-coded in accordance with
paragraph (g)(1)(i)of this standard. When a facility utilizes Universal
Precautions in the handling of all soiled laundry, alternative labeling or
color-coding is sufficient if it permits all employees to recognize the containers
{3} Whenever
as requiring compliance with Universal Precautions.
contaminated laundry is wet and presents a reasonable likelihood of
soak-through of or leakage from the bag or container, the laundry shall be
placed and transported in bags or containers which prevent soak-through and/or
leakage of fluids to the exterior.
(B) The employer shall ensure that employees who have contact with
contaminated laundry wear protective gloves and other appropriate personal
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protective equipment.
(C) When a facility ships contaminated laundry off-site to a second facility
which does not utilize Universal Precautions in the handling of all laundry, the
facility generating the contaminated laundry must place such laundry in bags or
containers which are labeled or color-coded in accordance with paragraph
(g)(1)(i).
(e) HIV and HBV Research Laboratories and Production Facilities.
(1) This paragraph applies to research laboratories and production facilities
engaged in the culture, production, concentration,experimentation, and
manipulation of HIV and HBV. It does not apply to clinical or diagnostic
laboratories engaged solely in the analysis of blood, tissues, or organs. These
requirements apply in addition to the other requirements of the standard.
(2) Research laboratories and production facilities shall meet the following
criteria:
(i) Standard Microbiological Practices. All regulated waste shall either be
incinerated or decontaminated by a method such as auto claving known to
effectively destroy bloodborne pathogens.
(ii) Special Practices
(A) Laboratory doors shall be kept closed when work involving HIV or HBV
is in progress. (B) Contaminated materials that are to be decontaminated at
a site away from the work area shall be placed in a durable, leak proof, labeled
or color-coded container that is closed before being removed from the work
area.
(C) Access to the work area shall be limited to authorized persons.Written
policies and procedures shall be established whereby only persons who have
been advised of the potential biohazard, who meet any specific entry
requirements, and who comply with all entry and exit procedures shall be
allowed to enter the work areas and animal rooms.
(D) When other potentially infectious materials or infected animals are present
in the work area or containment module, a hazard warning sign incorporating
the universal biohazard symbol shall be posted on all access doors. The hazard
warning sign shall comply with paragraph(g)(1)(ii) of this standard.
(E) All activities involving other potentially infectious materials shall be
conducted in biological safety cabinets or other physical-containment devices
within the containment module. No work with these other potentially infectious
materials shall be conducted on the open bench.
(F) Laboratory coats, gowns, smocks, uniforms, or other appropriate protective
clothing shall be used in the work area and animal rooms.Protective clothing
shall not be worn outside of the work area and shall be decontaminated before
being laundered.
(G) Special care shall be taken to avoid skin contact with other potentially
infectious materials. Gloves shall be worn when handling infected animals and
when making hand contact with other potentially infectious materials is
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unavoidable.
(H) Before disposal all waste from work areas and from animal rooms shall
either be incinerated or decontaminated by a method such as autoclaving known
to effectively destroy bloodborne pathogens.
(I) Vacuum lines shall be protected with liquid disinfectant traps and
high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters or filters of equivalent or superior
efficiency and which are checked routinely and maintained or replaced as
necessary.
(J) Hypodermic needles and syringes shall be used only for parenteral injection
and aspiration of fluids from laboratory animals and diaphragm bottles. Only
needle-locking syringes or disposable syringe-needle units(i.e., the needle is
integral to the syringe) shall be used for the injection or aspiration of other
potentially infectious materials.Extreme caution shall be used when handling
needles and syringes. A needle shall not be bent, sheared, replaced in the sheath
or guard, or removed from the syringe following use. The needle and syringe
shall be promptly placed in a puncture-resistant container and autoclave or
decontaminated before reuse or disposal.
(K) All spills shall be immediately contained and cleaned up by appropriate
professional staff or others properly trained and equipped to work with
potentially concentrated infectious materials.
(L) A spill or accident that results in an exposure incident shall be immediately
reported to the laboratory director or other responsible person.
(M) A biosafety manual shall be prepared or adopted and periodically
reviewed and updated at least annually or more often if necessary.Personnel
shall be advised of potential hazards, shall be required to read instructions on
practices and procedures, and shall be required to follow them.
(iii) Containment Equipment.
(A) Certified biological safety cabinets (Class I, II, or III) or other appropriate
combinations of personal protection or physical containment devices, such as
special protective clothing, respirators, centrifuge safety cups, sealed centrifuge
rotors, and containment caging for animals, shall be used for all activities with
other potentially infectious materials that pose a threat of exposure to
droplets,splashes, spills, or aerosols.
(B) Biological safety cabinets shall be certified when installed,whenever they
are moved and at least annually.
(3) HIV and HBV research laboratories shall meet the following criteria:
(i) Each laboratory shall contain a facility for hand washing and an eye wash
facility which is readily available within the work area.
(ii) An autoclave for decontamination of regulated waste shall be available.
(4) HIV and HBV production facilities shall meet the following criteria:
(i) The work areas shall be separated from areas that are open to unrestricted
traffic flow within the building. Passage through two sets of doors shall be the
basic requirement for entry into the work area from access corridors or other
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contiguous areas. Physical separation of the high-containment work area from
access corridors or other areas or activities may also be provided by a
double-doored clothes-change room(showers may be included), airlock, or other
access facility that requires passing through two sets of doors before entering the
work area.
(ii) The surfaces of doors, walls, floors and ceilings in the work area shall be
water resistant so that they can be easily cleaned. Penetrations in these surfaces
shall be sealed or capable of being sealed to facilitate decontamination.
(iii) Each work area shall contain a sink for washing hands and a readily
available eye wash facility. The sink shall be foot, elbow, or automatically
operated and shall be located near the exit door of the work area.
(iv) Access doors to the work area or containment module shall be self-closing.
(v) An autoclave for decontamination of regulated waste shall be available
within or as near as possible to the work area.
(vi) A ducted exhaust-air ventilation system shall be provided. This system
shall create directional airflow that draws air into the work area through the
entry area. The exhaust air shall not be recirculated to any other area of the
building, shall be discharged to the outside, and shall be dispersed away from
occupied areas and air intakes. The proper direction of the airflow shall be
verified (i.e., into the work area).
(5) Training Requirements. Additional training requirements for employees in
HIV and HBV research laboratories and HIV and HBV production facilities are
specified in paragraph (g)(2)(ix).
(f) Hepatitis B Vaccination and Post-exposure Evaluation and Follow-up.
(1) General.
(i) The employer shall make available the hepatitis B vaccine and vaccination
series to all employees who have occupational exposure, and post-exposure
evaluation and follow-up to all employees who have had an exposure incident.
(ii) The employer shall ensure that all medical evaluations and procedures
including the hepatitis B vaccine and vaccination series and post-exposure
evaluation and follow-up, including prophylaxis, are:
(A) Made available at no cost to the employee;
(B) Made available to the employee at a reasonable time and place;
(C) Performed by or under the supervision of a licensed physician or by or
under the supervision of another licensed healthcare professional;and
(D) Provided according to recommendations of the U.S. Public Health Service
current at the time these evaluations and procedures take place,except as
specified by this paragraph (f).
(iii) The employer shall ensure that all laboratory tests are conducted by an
accredited laboratory at no cost to the employee.
(2) Hepatitis B Vaccination.
(i) Hepatitis B vaccination shall be made available after the employee has
received the training required in paragraph (g)(2)(vii)(I) and within 10 working
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days of initial assignment to all employees who have occupational exposure
unless the employee has previously received the complete hepatitis B vaccination
series, antibody testing has revealed that the employee is immune, or the vaccine
is contraindicated for medical reasons.
(ii) The employer shall not make participation in a prescreening program a
prerequisite for receiving hepatitis B vaccination.
(iii) If the employee initially declines hepatitis B vaccination but at a later date
while still covered under the standard decides to accept the vaccination, the
employer shall make available hepatitis B vaccination at that time.
(iv) The employer shall assure that employees who decline to accept hepatitis
B vaccination offered by the employer sign the statement in Appendix A.
(v) If a routine booster dose(s) of hepatitis B vaccine is recommended by the
U.S. Public Health Service at a future date, such booster dose(s)shall be made
available in accordance with section (f)(1)(ii).
(3) Post-exposure Evaluation and Follow-up. Following a report of an exposure
incident, the employer shall make immediately available to the exposed
employee a confidential medical evaluation and follow-up,including at least the
following elements:
(i) Documentation of the route(s) of exposure, and the circumstances under
which the exposure incident occurred;
(ii) Identification and documentation of the source individual, unless the
employer can establish that identification is infeasible or prohibited by state or
local law;
(A) The source individual's blood shall be tested as soon as feasible and after
consent is obtained in order to determine HBV and HIV infectivity. If consent
is not obtained, the employer shall establish that legally required consent cannot
be obtained. When the source individual's consent is not required by law, the
source individual's blood, if available, shall be tested and the results
documented.
(B) When the source individual is already known to be infected with HBV or
HIV, testing for the source individual's known HBV or HIV status need not be
repeated.
(C) Results of the source individual's testing shall be made available to the
exposed employee, and the employee shall be informed of applicable laws and
regulations concerning disclosure of the identity and infectious status of the
source individual.
(iii) Collection and testing of blood for HBV and HIV serological status;
(A) The exposed employee's blood shall be collected as soon as feasible and
tested after consent is obtained.
(B) If the employee consents to baseline blood collection, but does not give
consent at that time for HIV serologic testing, the sample shall be preserved for
at least 90 days. If, within 90 days of the exposure incident, the employee elects
to have the baseline sample tested, such testing shall be done as soon as
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feasible.
(iv) Post-exposure prophylaxis, when medically indicated, as recommended by
the U.S. Public Health Service;
(v) Counseling; and
(vi) Evaluation of reported illnesses.
(4) Information Provided to the Healthcare Professional.
(i) The employer shall ensure that the healthcare professional responsible for
the employee's Hepatitis B vaccination is provided a copy of this regulation.
(ii) The employer shall ensure that the healthcare professional evaluating an
employee after an exposure incident is provided the following information:
(A) A copy of this regulation;
(B) A description of the exposed employee's duties as they relate to the
(C) Documentation of the route(s) of exposure and
exposure incident;
circumstances under which exposure occurred;
(D) Results of the source individual's blood testing, if available; and
(E) All medical records relevant to the appropriate treatment of the employee
including vaccination status which are the employer's responsibility to maintain.
(5) Healthcare Professional's Written Opinion. The employer shall obtain and
provide the employee with a copy of the evaluating health care professional's
written opinion within 15 days of the completion of the evaluation.
(i) The healthcare professional's written opinion for Hepatitis B vaccination
shall be limited to whether Hepatitis B vaccination is indicated for an employee,
and if the employee has received such vaccination.
(ii) The healthcare professional's written opinion for post-exposure evaluation
and follow-up shall be limited to the following information:
(A) That the employee has been informed of the results of the evaluation; and
(B) That the employee has been told about any medical conditions resulting
from exposure to blood or other potentially infectious materials which require
further evaluation or treatment.
(iii) All other findings or diagnoses shall remain confidential and shall not be
included in the written report.
(6) Medical Record keeping. Medical records required by this standard shall
be maintained in accordance with paragraph (h)(1) of this section.
(g) Communication of Hazards to Employees.
(1) Labels and Signs.
(i) Labels.
(A) Warning labels shall be affixed to containers of regulated
waste,refrigerators and freezers containing blood or other potentially infectious
material; and other containers used to store, transport or ship blood or other
potentially infectious materials, except as provided in paragraph (g)(1)(i)(E), (F)
and (G).
(B) Labels required by this section shall include the following legend: Place
Symbol here BIOHAZARD
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(C) These labels shall be fluorescent orange or orange-red or predominantly
so, with lettering or symbols in a contrasting color.
(D) Labels required by paragraph (g)(1)(i) shall either be an integral part of
the container or shall be affixed as close as feasible to the container by string,
wire, adhesive, or other method that prevents their loss or unintentional
removal.
(E) Red bags or red containers may be substituted for labels.
(F) Containers of blood, blood components, or blood products that are labeled
as to their contents and have been released for transfusion or other clinical use
are exempted from the labeling requirements of paragraph (g).
(G) Individual containers of blood or other potentially infectious materials that
are placed in a labeled container during storage,transport, shipment or disposal
are exempted from the labeling requirement.
(H) Labels required for contaminated equipment shall be in accordance with
this paragraph and shall also state which portions of the equipment remain
contaminated.
(I) Regulated waste that has been decontaminated need not be labeled or
color-coded. (ii) Signs.
(A) The employer shall post signs at the entrance to work areas specified in
paragraph (e), HIV and HBV Research Laboratory and Production Facilities,
which shall bear the following legend: biohazard symbol here BIOHAZARD
(Name of the Infectious Agent)(Special requirements for entering the area)
(Name, telephone number of the laboratory director or other responsible
person.)
(B) These signs shall be fluorescent orange-red or predominantly so,with
lettering or symbols in a contrasting color.
(2) Information and Training.
(i) Employers shall ensure that all employees with occupational exposure
participate in a training program which must be provided at no cost to the
employee and during working hours.
(ii) Training shall be provided as follows:
(A) At the time of initial assignment to tasks where occupational exposure may
take place; (B) Within 90 days after the effective date of the standard; and
(C) At least annually thereafter.
(iii) For employees who have received training on bloodborne pathogens in the
year preceding the effective date of the standard, only training with respect to
the provisions of the standard which were not included need be provided.
(iv) Annual training for all employees shall be provided within one year of
their previous training.
(v) Employers shall provide additional training when changes such as
modification of tasks or procedures or institution of new tasks or procedures
affect the employee's occupational exposure. The additional training may be
limited to addressing the new exposures created.
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(vi) Material appropriate in content and vocabulary to educational level,
literacy, and language of employees shall be used.
(vii) The training program shall contain at a minimum the following elements:
(A) An accessible copy of the regulatory text of this standard and an
explanation of its contents;
(B) A general explanation of the epidemiology and symptoms of bloodborne
diseases;
(C) An explanation of the modes of transmission of bloodborne pathogens;
(D) An explanation of the employer's exposure control plan and the means by
which the employee can obtain a copy of the written plan;
(E) An explanation of the appropriate methods for recognizing tasks and other
activities that may involve exposure to blood and other potentially infectious
materials;
(F) An explanation of the use and limitations of methods that will prevent or
reduce exposure including appropriate engineering controls,work practices, and
personal protective equipment;
(G) Information on the types, proper use, location, removal,
handling,decontamination and disposal of personal protective equipment;
(H) An explanation of the basis for selection of personal protective equipment;
(I) Information on the hepatitis B vaccine, including information on its
efficacy, safety, method of administration, the benefits of being vaccinated, and
that the vaccine and vaccination will be offered free of charge;
(J) Information on the appropriate actions to take and persons to contact in
an emergency involving blood or other potentially infectious materials;
(K) An explanation of the procedure to follow if an exposure incident occurs,
including the method of reporting the incident and the medical follow-up that
will be made available;
(L) Information on the post-exposure evaluation and follow-up that the
employer is required to provide for the employee following an exposure
incident;
(M) An explanation of the signs and labels and/or color coding required by
paragraph (g)(1); and
(N) An opportunity for interactive questions and answers with the person
conducting the training session.
(viii) The person conducting the training shall be knowledgeable in the subject
matter covered by the elements contained in the training program as it relates
to the workplace that the training will address.
(ix) Additional Initial Training for Employees in HIV and HBV Laboratories
and Production Facilities. Employees in HIV or HBV research laboratories and
HIV or HBV production facilities shall receive the following initial training in
addition to the above training requirements.
(A) The employer shall assure that employees demonstrate proficiency in
standard microbiological practices and techniques and in the practices and
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operations specific to the facility before being allowed to work with HIV or
HBV.
(B) The employer shall assure that employees have prior experience in the
handling of human pathogens or tissue cultures before working with HIV or
HBV.
(C) The employer shall provide a training program to employees who have no
prior experience in handling human pathogens. Initial work activities shall not
include the handling of infectious agents. A progression of work activities shall
be assigned as techniques are learned and proficiency is developed. The
employer shall assure that employees participate in work activities involving
infectious agents only after proficiency has been demonstrated.
(h) Record keeping.
(1) Medical Records.
(i) The employer shall establish and maintain an accurate record for each
employee with occupational exposure, in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.20.
(ii) This record shall include:
(A) The name and social security number of the employee;
(B) A copy of the employee's hepatitis B vaccination status including the dates
of all the hepatitis B vaccinations and any medical records relative to the
employee's ability to receive vaccination as required by paragraph (f)(2);
(C) A copy of all results of examinations, medical testing, and follow-up
procedures as required by paragraph (f)(3);
(D) The employer's copy of the healthcare professional's written opinion as
required by paragraph (f)(5); and
(E) A copy of the information provided to the healthcare professional as
required by paragraphs (f)(4)(ii)(B)(C) and (D).
(iii) Confidentiality. The employer shall ensure that employee medical records
required by paragraph (h)(1) are:
(A) Kept confidential; and
(B) Are not disclosed or reported without the employee's express written
consent to any person within or outside the workplace except as required by this
section or as may be required by law.
(iv) The employer shall maintain the records required by paragraph (h)for at
least the duration of employment plus 30 years in accordance with29 CFR
1910.20.
(2) Training Records.
(i) Training records shall include the following information:
(A) The dates of the training sessions;
(B) The contents or a summary of the training sessions;
(C) The names and qualifications of persons conducting the training;and
(D) The names and job titles of all persons attending the training sessions.
(ii) Training records shall be maintained for 3 years from the date on which
the training occurred.
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(3) Availability.
(i) The employer shall ensure that all records required to be maintained by
this section shall be made available upon request to the Assistant Secretary and
the Director for examination and copying.
(ii) Employee training records required by this paragraph shall be provided
upon request for examination and copying to employees, to employee
representatives, to the Director, and to the Assistant Secretary in accordance
with 29 CFR 1910.20.
(iii) Employee medical records required by this paragraph shall be provided
upon request for examination and copying to the subject employee, to anyone
having written consent of the subject employee, to the Director, and to the
Assistant Secretary in accordance with 29 CFR1910.20.
(4) Transfer of Records.
(i) The employer shall comply with the requirements involving transfer of
records set forth in 29 CFR1910.20(h).
(ii) If the employer ceases to do business and there is no successor employer
to receive and retain the records for the prescribed period, the employer shall
notify the Director, at least three months prior to their disposal and transmit
them to the Director, if required by the Director to do so, within that three
month period.
(i) Dates.
(1) Effective Date. The standard shall become effective on March 6,1992.
(2) The Exposure Control Plan required by paragraph (c)(2) of this section
shall be completed on or before May 5, 1992.
(3) Paragraph (g)(2) Information and Training and (h) Record keeping shall
take effect on or before June 4, 1992.
(4) Paragraphs (d)(2) Engineering and Work Practice Controls, (d)(3)Personal
Protective Equipment, (d)(4) Housekeeping, (e) HIV and HBV Research
Laboratories and Production Facilities, (f) Hepatitis B Vaccination and
(g)(1)Labels and Signs, shall
Post-Exposure Evaluation and Follow-up, and
take effect July 6, 1992.* [Effective date for this standard 1910.1030, is March
6, 1992]
Part Number
1910 Standard Number 1910.1030 App A Title Appendix
A - Hepatitis B Vaccine Declination (Mandatory) * [Effective date for this
standard, 1910.1030, is March 6, 1992] I understand that due to my
occupational exposure to blood or other potentially infectious materials I may
be at risk of acquiring hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection. I have been given the
opportunity to be vaccinated with hepatitis B vaccine, at no charge to myself.
However, I decline hepatitis B vaccination at this time. I understand that by
declining this vaccine, I continue to be at risk of acquiring hepatitis B, a serious
disease. If in the future I continue to have occupational exposure to blood or
other potentially infectious materials and I want to be vaccinated with hepatitis
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B vaccine, I can receive the vaccination series at no charge to me.* (Approved
by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 1218-0180)*
[56 FR 64004, Dec. 06, 1991; 57 FR April 13, 1992]
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GLOSSARY
ACET - Advisory Committee for Elimination of Tuberculosis
AFB - Acid Fast Bacilli
ASHRAE - American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning
Engineers
ATP - Adenosine Triphosphate
CDC - Center for Disease Control
ED - Emergency Department
EMB - Ethionamide
EMS - Emergency Medical Service
HBV - Hepatitis B Virus
HEPA - High Efficiency Particulate Airfilter
HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus
INH - Isoniazid
MRTB - Multidrug Resistant Tuberculosis
NIOSH - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PAPR - Powered Air-purified Respirator
PAS - Para-Aminosalicylic Acid
PEL - Permissible Exposure Limit
PPD - Purified Protein Derivative
PPE - Personal Protective Equipment
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PR - Personal Respirator
PZA - Pyrazinamide
QLFT - Qualitative Fit Testing
QNFT - Quantitative Fit Testing
RIF - Rifampin
SM - Streptomycin
TB - Tuberculosis
TLV - Threshold Limit Value
TU - Tuberculin Units
UV - Ultra Violet

